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1 Introduction
The process of economic reforms launched in 1978, and gradually extended until current days, has
catapulted China into a stellar growth trajectory that has proven resilient. Because a variety of new
policies and institutions were introduced simultaneously, even today it is di¢ cult to pinpoint which of
them were crucial. This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the policy roots of
Chinas success by focusing on a major component of its industrial policy. It also provides new evidence
in the debate about the e¤ect of place-based policies.
We exploit the variation across cities and years in the establishment of di¤erent types of Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) to estimate the e¤ects of SEZ on economic development. SEZ are a salient
component of the reform process for a variety of reasons. First, they have been a centerpiece of
the gradualist Chinese development strategy based on the learning-through-experimentation principle.
Second, they have fostered an uneven development across geographic areas and sectors. Last but not
least important, their e¤ects are easier to measure than those of other reforms, as they took the form
of well-dened changes in the legal status staggered across di¤erent Chinese cities. The rst SEZ were
introduced as experiments in market allocation in geographically restricted areas along the coast. SEZ
enjoyed special rules applying to labor markets, foreign direct investments, rmsownership, and export
controls. Another important di¤erence from the rest of the country is that local political leaders were
granted substantial autonomy and could shape key aspects of industrial policy. After the success of the
early experiments, SEZ were extended rst to other cities along the coast and then, starting in the early
1990s, to inland regions. The establishment of new zones has continued until today. For instance, in
September 2013 the government of Li Keqiang has launched the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone, which
grants the Pudong area full liberalization of foreign trade and partial capital market liberalization.
We use a panel of 276 cities over the period 1988-2010.1 Our econometric strategy is a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence estimation controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity at the city level. We also control for
province-specic shocks by using provincetime xed e¤ects. We rst regress (the logarithm of) GDP
or GDP per capita on a reform indicator that switches on (i.e., takes the unit value) in the year after
a city has received SEZ status, controlling for city characteristics such as land area. In our baseline
specication, the introduction of a SEZ is associated with a permanent increase in the citys GDP
level of about 12%. The e¤ect on GDP per capita is about 9%. The result is robust to controlling
for local government spending. To account for gradual e¤ects of the reform, we also consider more
exible specications where the e¤ect of the reform is allowed to vary, both parametrically and non-
parametrically, as a function of the time elapsed since the start of the treatment. We nd an increasing
cumulative e¤ect of the policy treatment that attens out after about ten years; the long-term e¤ect
of a SEZ is estimated to be a di¤erential increase of about 20% in the GDP level. We also study the
channels through which GDP and GDP per capita increased as cities were granted SEZ status. SEZ
attract larger populations, more investments in physical and human capital, and experience stronger
increases in total factor productivity (TFP).
A common objection to place-based industrial policy is that it may induce a concentration of eco-
nomic activity in some areas by drawing resources away from other locations. We nd no evidence of
such beggar-thy-neighbor e¤ects on GDP. To detect potential cross-city spillovers, we investigate how
the performance of cities varies with their distance from SEZ in other cities. The identifying assump-
tion is that the spillover intensity decays with the distance from the SEZ. Distance is measured in
1More precisely, we use data on prefecture-level cities, which are administrative units below provinces and above
counties. See Section 3 for details.
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three alternative ways: geodesic distance, driving time on the current roads network, and the computed
shortest path through the physical geography. In all specications, SEZ appear to generate positive
(often highly signicant) spillovers on nearby cities. We also compute measures of exposure to other
zones by creating a sum over GDP in other cities with a SEZ, weighted by the inverse of distance to
those cities. We again nd some evidence of positive spillovers, especially strong in inland provinces,
albeit often imprecisely estimated. We then investigate whether SEZ lead to a reallocation from areas
that are further away from the zone to areas in the proximity of the zone. We consider various rings of
up to 400 kilometer around the zone. Spillovers typically decline with distance. Interestingly, we nd no
negative spillovers even at these medium distances. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the e¤ect of SEZ is driven exclusively by direct transfers and political connections of the cities
involved. This could not explain why cities close to SEZ beneted from the policy.
Our analysis is subject to two caveats. First, the assignment of cities to treatment and control groups
may not be random. The Chinese government might have selected cities based on some prior knowledge
that the conditions for industrial development might be especially favorable (picking winners), or to the
opposite, in order to curb regional inequality. The narrative suggests that a picking-the-winner strategy
may have been especially important in the rst stage of the reforms, when all SEZ were chosen along
the coast and close to potential trading partners and investors such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Ideally,
one would like to have instruments to isolate exogenous sources of variation in the reform treatment,
but nding valid instruments is di¢ cult in practice. We mitigate the concern with endogeneity through
three complementary strategies. First, we restrict the sample to cities located in inland provinces
where the selection of the zones was largely based on a rigid administrative criterion, i.e., being a
provincial capital. Second, we augment the regressions with indicators for the immediate pre-reform
years to capture di¤erential trends. Third, we control for exible di¤erential trends depending on the
initial conditions of the di¤erent cities. This is potentially important, since the cities hosting SEZ
are on average more densely populated and more developed than those that did not host SEZ. The
results are reassuring: the e¤ect of SEZ is robust in the restricted sample, di¤erentials before the actual
establishment of the zone are insignicant, and allowing for di¤erential trends based on the initial
development or population density does not signicantly a¤ect the coe¢ cients of interest.
The second caveat concerns data quality. One might worry that local statistics may be manipulated
strategically by local o¢ cers in order to create the impression that an SEZ was successful so as to
attract government support. In addition, while city-level nominal GDP data are available, city-level
price deators are more problematic (and only available for fewer cities/years). In our main specication,
we use only nominal variables. The inclusion of city xed e¤ects removes any bias arising from time-
invariant price level di¤erences. Ination di¤erences across provinces are absorbed by the interaction
between time and province xed e¤ects. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that di¤erent cities within
the same province may experience di¤erent ination rates. This would be a problem for our strategy if
the SEZ status triggers systematically higher ination rates, as in this case part of our estimated e¤ect
would be due to ination. To address this concern, we rst document that, in the more restricted sample
for which we have data on prices at the city level, treated cities do not appear to have experienced higher
ination than did cities without SEZ. Next, we complement our analysis with alternative proxies of GDP
that do not depend on prices: light intensity measured by satellites and electricity consumption. The
results conrm the existence of robust signicant e¤ects of SEZ.
3
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the large international literature studying the e¤ect of place-based policy,
comprehensively reviewed by the recent papers of Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Kline and Moretti
(2014a), and Neumark and Simpson (2015). In developed countries, place-based policies often target
the development of lagging regions. Chinas SEZ incorporate both e¢ ciency and equity motivations
together with the additional target of experimenting with market reforms. On the e¢ ciency side, SEZ
pursued the reduction of pre-existing distortions and the exploitation of agglomeration e¤ects. On the
equity side, the expansion since 1992 toward inland cities promoted the development of poorer Chinese
regions.2
In line with the results of our paper, the literature nds positive e¤ects of place-based policies in
a number of instances. Criscuolo et al. (2012) use rm level data to study an investment subsidy
program in the U.K. and nd positive e¤ects on employment, investment, and net entry. However,
contrary to our study, they nd no e¤ect on TFP. Busso et al. (2013) compare locations selected
for special treatment, such as tax-credits and subsidies for disadvantaged neighborhoods, with similar
locations that were rejected or treated in a second round. They conclude that the policy had signicant
positive e¤ects on employment and wages, while the e¢ ciency costs were relatively small. Kline and
Moretti (2014b) study the long-run e¤ects of place-based policies by focusing on a subsidy program in
the U.S. that supported lagging regions. They nd positive direct e¤ects on productivity. Martin et al.
(2011a) in contrast do not nd positive e¤ects from subsidies to Local Productive Systems in France.
Some papers try to assess, as we do, whether place-based policies generate spillovers either positive
or negative  to non-treated areas. The evidence is mixed. Criscuolo et al. (2012) aggregate their
observations to larger geographical units that incorporate neighboring non-treated areas. They nd that
the positive treatment e¤ect is not reduced by this aggregation, suggesting that there were no negative
spillovers through reallocation from non-treated to treated rms within the same area. This is similar to
our nding that SEZ had a positive e¤ect on the prefecture area around the urban core. Furthermore,
we also nd some evidence of positive cross-city spillovers. Neumark and Kolko (2010) nd insignicant
employment spillovers of Californias enterprise zones and Martin et al. (2011a) obtain a similar result
for France. One economic rationale for place-based policy is to foster local agglomeration forces. Kline
and Moretti (2014b) nd no aggregate gains through agglomeration forces, because local gains are o¤set
by losses elsewhere. Greenstone et al. (2010) estimate the e¤ect of large plant openings on incumbent
rmsTFP. They nd that these agglomeration spillovers are positive but vary substantially across
di¤erent cases. Briant et al. (2015) and Devereux et al. (2007) also nd evidence of heterogeneous
e¤ects of place-based policies.
We are not the rst to study the e¤ects of Chinas SEZ. Most of the earlier studies, arguably due to
data constraints, rely on comparisons of the cross-sectional variation in economic performance rather
than on a di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology. Wei (1993) uses city-level data for a sample of coastal
cities where special policies were introduced in 1984, and documents that cities hosting SEZ have a
signicantly higher average growth rate during the early reform period, while other types of preferential
policies do not produce the same e¤ects.3 Since his sample ends in 1990, when only a small subset of
the cities had been granted the status of SEZ, his identication relies on the cross-sectional comparison
between early reformers a small and arguably selected group and cities that were never granted the
2Akinci and Crittle (2008) provide a cross-country comparison specically focusing on di¤erent types of special economic
zones and their role for development.
3Wei (1993) uses two samples: the rst has 434 cities but only a limited time variation from 1988-1990. The second
sample includes fewer cities (74) and covers the period 1980-1990.
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SEZ status at the time of his study. Weis pioneer study is extended by Démurger et al. (2002) and
Jones et al. (2003), who also document di¤erences in growth rates between treated and non-treated
cities. Di¤erent from these articles, our study exploits the staggered establishment of SEZ across cities.
This allows us to estimate the treatment e¤ect controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity (city xed
e¤ects) and time-varying province-level shocks.
A recent study by Wang (2013) also uses a panel of Chinese cities and nds, using a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence approach similar to ours, positive e¤ects of SEZ on foreign direct investments (FDI), exports,
and the output of foreign enterprises. The e¤ects on other outcome variables (which do not comprise
GDP) are smaller and less robust. Our ndings are complementary to Wang (2013) insofar as we focus
on GDP and GDP per capita, a comprehensive measure for the development of the local economy,
while her study focuses on intermediate targets of the policy. An important di¤erence for our analysis
is that we distinguish between state-level and province-level SEZ (see below for a detailed motivation for
this choice). Without drawing such a distinction, the introduction of SEZ would yield no statistically
signicant e¤ect on GDP in our sample. Other studies focus on di¤erent economic outcomes. For
example, Cheng and Kwan (2000) show that provinces hosting SEZ attract signicantly more FDI than
do other provinces. Head and Ries (1996) analyze the location decision of international rms in Chinese
cities and nd that SEZ have a positive e¤ect that is amplied by agglomeration economies.
A number of studies look at rm-level data. Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) estimate the
e¤ect of being located inside SEZ on rmsproductivity and export behavior. They nd that rms in
SEZ export more, have higher output per worker and higher capital intensity, but no higher TFP once
selection is controlled for. Their control group consists of rms outside of the SEZ in the same industry
and in the same broadly dened regions (west, central and coastal). Our nding of positive e¤ects of
SEZ on TFP hinges on a comparison of the average performance of rms before and after the onset of a
SEZ. Lu et al. (2015) compare rms that are located inside of SEZ with rms across the zone boundary
and nd positive e¤ects. Similarly, Zheng et al. (2015) study local spillover e¤ects of SEZ in eight
Chinese cities using rm-level data for the period 19982007. They nd positive spillover e¤ects of SEZ
on productivity and consumption in the area surrounding the SEZ. This result is consistent with our
nding that there are positive e¤ects of SEZ on the periphery around the urban core. Finally, Brooks et
al. (2015) study the role of collusion in industrial clusters and nd that collusion is particularly strong
in SEZ.
Our study also relates more generally to a large literature on liberalization and industrial policy,
including specic applications to the Chinese reform process.4 Rodrik (2006) argues that government
policies creating distortions in favor of more advanced industries played an important role in the success
of Chinese reforms. Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and Rodrik (2004) argue that, through experimen-
tation, the state can generate information about the potential of di¤erent sectors. Brandt and Zhu
(2010) nd that rising TFP in the private sector was an important driver of Chinas growth. Our
ndings are broadly consistent with these views. Finally, our study has some similarity in both the
methodology and motivation with Aghion et al. (2008) studying the e¤ect of industrial policy (the
demise of the License Raj) in India. Similar to our study, they exploit the fact that the reforms were
staggered across time and sectors. However, di¤erent from our study, they emphasize the interaction
between the reform and state-level characteristics of the labor market. Moreover, they study an episode
of pure liberalization (delicensing), while Chinas industrial policy also entails proactive policy elements
(tax credits, subsidies, etc.).
4See Perkins (1988), Naughton (2007), Brandt and Rawski (2008), and Xu (2011).
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the historical and institutional
background of the Chinese industrial policy. Section 3 describes the data sources and the sample.
Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and the main results. Section 5 decomposes the e¤ects of
the SEZ into factor accumulation and total factor productivity. Section 6 discusses the spillover e¤ects
of the policy. Section 7 performs a variety of robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. The Online
Appendix contains additional tables, gures and details on the data.
2 Institutional Features of SEZ
Since its establishment in 1949, the Peoples Republic of China relied on rigid economic planning. The
two decades preceding Maos death in 1976 were characterized by a volatile economic performance and
by an intense social turmoil.5 The reformist political leadership that won the battle for Maos succession
in 1978, led by Deng Xiaoping, faced the desperate need for measures to restore social cohesion and
revitalize the economy. There were, however, no existing blueprints showing how to proceed. Learning-
through-experimentation then became the guiding principle of economic reforms. As Deng put it: one
has to grope for stepping-stones as he crosses the river.The rst policy breakthrough happened in rural
areas, where the Household Responsibility System entitled farmers, after fullling their procurement
quota, to the rest of their agricultural output. However, the leadership soon realized that reforms had
to be extended to urban China, and that industrialization necessitated opening up China to foreign
investments.
The idea of SEZ was per se no Chinese innovation. Chinas SEZ inherited some essential character-
istics of the Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which had already been established in over 80 countries
by 1980 (Naughton 2007 and Vogel 2011). Like EPZ, SEZ were designed to circumvent the complex
rules of import and export. Chinas SEZ were special in the sense that they also bore the responsi-
bility of policy innovation and experimentation. They were the laboratories for the market economy
(Vogel 2011). The local o¢ cials of the zones were implicitly encouraged to be innovative in designing
economic policies and institutions. Successful innovations were retained and extended to later waves of
development zones (Yeung et al. 2009).
2.1 The Timeline of SEZ
In the year 1980, four cities in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou,
and Xiamen, were granted the SEZ status.6 The success of the experiment was remarkable: between
1980 and 1984 Shenzhen grew at an annual rate of 54%, and in 1984 the four SEZ alone attracted 26%
of Chinas total FDI. In addition, the zones had developed a set of well-functioning markets for labor,
land, capital, transportation, and technology (Zeng 2010).
The establishment of SEZ met the resistance of the conservative fraction of the Communist Partys
(CCP) central committee that viewed renting Chinas land to foreign companies and allowing them to
exploit Chinas cheap labor as unacceptable. However, the success of the experiment strengthened the
reformist fraction in the CCP and softened the conservative opposition. In 1984, 14 coastal cities were
5For more detailed analyses of the economic growth of China before and after the start of economic reforms, see
Cheremukhin et al. (2015), Song et al. (2011), and Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014).
6The SEZ status implied tax deductions, special tari¤s for import and export, and exemptions from the regulations
on foreign exchange and land use. Foreign rms that resided inside of the SEZ rst enjoyed two years of tax holiday, then
three years of a low tax rate of 7.5%, and after the initial ve years a tax rate of 15%. Outside of the zones, the tax rate
for foreign rms was 33% and for state-owned rms 55% (see Wei 1993).
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granted the right to build Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ). The ETDZ shared
most of the policies and privileges granted earlier to the initial four SEZ.
During January and February of 1992, Deng made a celebrated tour to southern China, including
stops at the SEZ of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, to mark the end of a period of political instability and
to restate the commitment of the CCP to the reform process. Shortly afterwards, a new SEZ called
Pudong New Area was established in Shanghai. In May, the CCP announced the plan to grant the
ve inland cities along the Yangtze River, nine border cities, and all thirty of the provincial capital the
same privileges as the SEZ (Fewsmith 2001). Following the instruction, several ETDZ and High-tech
Industry Development Zones (HIDZ) were approved during 1992-1993 and 2000-2002, all located in
inland provinces.
In the rst decade of the XXIst Century, the introduction of SEZ spread quickly across China. By
2005, the system of state-level development zones comprised 54 ETDZ, 53 HIDZ, 15 Bonded Zones
(BZ) and 60 Export Processing Zones (EPZ).7 In the year 2005, the 54 ETDZ accounted for 4.49%
of the national GDP and for 14.93% of national export (Ministry of Commerce 2006). Establishing a
development zone became a common strategy for the local government to attract FDI and foster local
economic growth. Through shu­ ing local o¢ cials across di¤erent regions, the governments di¤used the
knowledge and experiences accumulated in the early zones to help develop new SEZ (Xu 2011). Figure
1 shows that by 2010 SEZ had been established throughout the country.
2.2 Di¤erent Types of the Special Economic Zones
To summarize the discussion above, there exist ve types of state-level SEZ: Comprehensive SEZ (CSEZ,
a label we coin to distinguish the early zones from the general notion of SEZ), ETDZ, HIDZ, BZ, EPZ,
and in addition Border Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZ). They all share preferential treatment
in terms of tax deduction, custom duty deduction, reduced land-use price, exibility in signing labor
contract and nancing. However, they are administered by di¤erent authorities: the CSEZ, ETDZ and
HIDZ are directed by the State Council (the HIDZ being co-directed by the Ministry of Science and
Technology); BZ and EPZ are directed by customs; BECZ were directed by the State Council until
2007, and are now under the control of the Ministry of Commerce.
In addition, the zones di¤er in their stated mission. The goal of the CSEZ and of the ETDZ is to
attract FDI and to boost export activity. They are also explicitly encouraged to design and experiment
with new institutions and policies. The goal of HIDZ is to foster domestic high-tech industries. The
BZ are free-trade zones located in coastal port cities or border cities where import and export can be
expedited at a higher speed. The function of EPZ is to import raw materials from abroad, process
them, and export the nal goods without entering the real territory of China. Many of the EPZ are
established within pre-existing ETDZ and HIDZ. The BECZ intend to take advantage of the location
of the border cities to foster trade with other countries.
Aside from de jure changes, the central government is likely to have supported SEZ by assigning
capable local leaders and providing administrative support. Because of data limitations (in particular,
we have no data for transfers from the central government to cities), in the baseline regressions we simply
regard any such complementary measure as part of the treatment. However, in the robustness analysis
of Section 7.2 we attempt to separate the e¤ects of government spending and road infrastructure, for
which we have data.
7See section 2.2 for details on the di¤erence between the zones.
7
Together with state-level SEZ, China saw the proliferation of a variety of development zones under
the authority of provinces.8 There are some important di¤erences between state-level and province-level
SEZ. The state council explicitly requests that the policies given to the province-level development zones
should not be comparable to those given to the state-level ones,in order to prevent excessive competition
between the zones and the waste of land resources (State Administration of Taxation 2004).9 The
political autonomy of the province-level zones is also much more limited. Finally, many province-level
zones target specic industries whose selection depends on the capture of local interests. Overall,
province-level SEZ are a patchwork of di¤erent policies rather than a coherent policy instrument. This
causes a severe measurement error problem. In our analysis below, we nd that province-level zones
have an insignicant e¤ect on economic development.
3 Data
The main data source is the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), that publishes the China
City Statistical Yearbooks including GDP, electricity consumption, population, education, investment,
foreign direct investment, government spending, government income, and land area. In addition, we use
the light intensity data from weather satellites as a proxy for GDP. More detailed information about
the data sources is provided in the appendix.
The main unit of analysis is a prefecture-level city, an administrative division ranking below a
province and above a county in Chinas administrative structure. A prefecture-level city comprises a
core urban area and a surrounding periphery that may include rural areas, other smaller cities, towns
and villages. The NBS reports separate statistics for the core and the periphery of each prefecture-level
city. In our baseline we use the larger denition of the prefecture-level city that includes the core and
the periphery, but we have also done the analysis when restricting to the urban core. One advantage
of considering the larger area as opposed to focusing on the urban core is that border changes are less
frequent for the former.10 Henceforth, unless an ambiguity arises, we refer to a prefecture-level city as
a city.
The sample period is 1988-2010. At instances, city borders were changed by administrative reforms.
While this was less frequent for the borders for the broad denition of a city (including the periphery)
than for the urban cores, it is important to take the changes of borders into account. This information
on changes in the land area is reported in the China City Statistical Yearbooks. We focus on 276
cities, excluding from our analysis the four cities in which CSEZ were introduced before 1988, as
well as Hainan, where the entire province received the status of SEZ in 1988. We drop two city-year
observations where a county-level city was promoted to a prefecture-level city which implied that it
incorporated the periphery, but the associated border change occurs with a one-year delay in some
variables. Furthermore, we exclude Tibet, where we have data for only one city, and the province-level
municipalities, including Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, because our set of province-time
xed e¤ects would absorb all variation in GDP.
8Online Appendix Table A1 lists the number of state-level and province-level development zones and their average
share of industrial output in three coastal provinces hosting a large share of SEZ. The data are from WEFore (2010)
for the year 2009. All three provinces have a larger number of province-level than of state-level zones (a ratio of 7:1).
However, the state-level zones account for a far larger share of industrial output.
9Such competition is also a concern in other countries. See for example Ossa (2015) for a general equilibrium analysis
of subsidy competition in the U.S.
10Although we can track border changes (of the core and the periphery) over time by controlling for land area as
reported in the statistical yearbooks, they are less of a concern when considering the larger area.
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3.1 Main Variables
We start by listing the outcome variables that are used as the dependent variables in the regression
analysis. Unless stated otherwise, the variables from the yearbooks are for the city area that combines
the urban core and the periphery.
 logGDP and log (GDP=L) are, respectively, the (logarithm of) GDP and of GDP per capita
at the city level. Population measures are constructed based on the census and the statistical
yearbooks.
 logElectricity is the electricity consumption and is available for the same set of cities as GDP
but only for their urban cores. It measures the use of electricity for household consumption and
industrial production.
 logLight is the average light intensity. In the data provided by the National Geographical Data
Center, light intensity is measured on approximately each square km (pixel) on a discrete scale
from 0-63. We use digital maps from 2010 to aggregate the light intensity of the pixels to ad-
ministrative units. We use the maps of urban cores, which corresponds to the level at which the
electricity data are available.11 When using logLight; we must restrict the sample to the period
1992-2010 for which the light data are available.
 log (K=L) is the physical capital per capita. The physical capital stock is constructed by applying
the perpetual inventory method to the investment data for the period 1988-2010, assuming an
annual depreciation rate of 8%. For some cities, we collect the investment data from the New
China in 60 Years Provincial Statistical Collection for the earlier period 1978-1987. The province-
specic investment deator is from the New China in 60 Years Statistical Collection.
 logL is the population size (a proxy for the labor force). Population data is available from
the census and, annually, from the China City Statistical Yearbooks. The census data is more
comprehensive (in particular, it includes non-hukou population), but it is only available every ten
years. Therefore, we construct the observations between two editions of the census based on the
growth rate from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.12
 log h is the average human capital, constructed using average educational attainment of the pop-
ulation over the age of 6. The educational attainment data comes from the China Population
Census.
 log TFP is total factor productivity, constructed with an estimated production function and
physical capital, human capital, and population of each city.
Next, we discuss the construction of the explanatory variables. The main variables of interest are
indicators for the presence of SEZ. For each of the di¤erent types of SEZ we construct a dummy,
I_Reformit (where i denotes the city, and t denotes the year), which switches on (i.e., takes the unit
value) in the year after the establishment of a zone and retains the unit value in all following years.
11Note that, unlike for GDP, we can hold the area of the urban core constant when measuring light intensity based on
the 2010 maps. The concerns due to border changes therefore do not apply here.
12A detailed description of this process can be found in Online Appendix B.
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Formally, we dene the reform indicator based on the establishment of a zone as
I_Reformit =
8<:1 if ReformY eari < t0 otherwise: ;
where ReformY eari is the year in which the zone was established in city i and t is the current year. In
our baseline specication we will focus on the rst state-level zone that was established in city i. Note
that for cities that never host a zone I_Reformit = 0 for all t. We also construct separate dummies
for each lag from the reform year, as discussed in more detail in the empirical sections.
3.2 Control Variables
We use two main control variables from the China City Statistical Yearbooks. First, the geographic size of
the city, to which we refer as land area measured in square kilometers. This variable is available annually
and varies over time, reecting changes in the legal city boundaries. Second, in some specications, we
control for population size.
In order to assess spillover e¤ects that may depend on distance or transport costs between cities,
we calculate a variety of di¤erent measures related to distance or driving time between cities. First,
we calculate the geodesic distance in kilometers between all pairs of cities in our sample. Second,
we calculate the driving time on the current road infrastructure using Google maps. Third, we use
topographical features such as the slope of the terrain and use shortest path algorithms to construct
transport cost measures.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the dependent variables and of the main control variables.13
We have over 5000 observations for GDP from an unbalanced panel of 276 cities from 1988 to 2010. Our
policy variable, the establishment of SEZ, is illustrated in Figure 2. This gure shows the time evolution
of the shares of cities hosting the di¤erent types of zones in the balanced sample. The gure also shows
the share of cities that have any state-level zone. The two most important types of zones are HIDZ and
ETDZ with shares reaching 26% and 22% in 2010, respectively. Two types of zones existed before the
start of our sample: the CSEZ, established in 1980, and a few early ETDZ, established in 1984. ETDZ
and HIDZ are altogether the most frequent zone types. We also consider Export Processing Zones
(EPZ) and other less frequent types of zones (e.g., BZ and BECZ), introduced in cities that already
hosted either ETDZ or HIDZ.
We report the mean values of city characteristics separately for reformers and non-reformers in
Table 2. We distinguish three broad categories, with breakdown by coastal and inland cities: cities that
received the rst SEZ before 1988, cities that received the rst SEZ in 1988 or later, and cities that never
hosted a SEZ in the sample. As the table shows, cities hosting a SEZ were larger in terms of population
and richer in terms of GDP per capita. They also tended to have more universities relative to other
cities. Government spending over GDP was instead higher in non-reformers. Our empirical specication
controls for city xed e¤ects ltering out the e¤ect of time-invariant heterogeneity. However, one might
be concerned about pre-treatment di¤erences having di¤erential e¤ects on growth or on the e¤ectiveness
13For the dependent variable we show the statistics for real GDP based on provincial price deators, but in the empirical
analysis we use nominal GDP because the province-year xed e¤ects absorb price changes at the province level. See also
the next section.
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of the policy treatment. Our strategies to address these challenges are explained in detail in Sections 4
and 7.
3.4 Price Deators
The China City Statistical Yearbooks report nominal GDP for the period 1988-2010. Since Chinese
price data are regarded as somewhat unreliable (see, for example, Young 2003), we opt to use nominal
data. Time-invariant di¤erences in price levels across cities and time-varying ination di¤erences across
provinces are absorbed, respectively, by city and provincetime xed e¤ects. This approach would be
problematic if ination rates di¤ered signicantly across cities within each province. The main concern
is that the SEZ treatment might systematically increase local ination. We check if there are di¤erences
in ination rates between treated and non-treated cities in those years for which real GDP data are
available from the NBS. More precisely, we compute an implicit city-level deator using the data on
nominal and real GDP, and compare it between cities with and without a SEZ. We nd that, within
each province, cities with a SEZ did not have higher ination.14 As an alternative strategy that avoids
relying on prices altogether, we use electricity consumption (in GWh) and light intensity as proxies for
the level of economic activity.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Motivation
In this section, we discuss the econometric strategy and the main results. We use a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence estimator exploiting the variation in economic policy across a panel of cities and over 23
years following the establishment of SEZ.
Although the focus of the paper is empirical, and we do not present a formal model, it is useful
to motivate and interpret our analysis in the light of spatial equilibrium models such as Greenstone et
al. (2010) and Redding (2012). Greenstone et al. (2010) construct a model economy comprising many
locations where rms produce using labor, capital, and land. Firms are perfectly mobile, and their
prots are equalized in equilibrium. Workers are only partially mobile due to idiosyncratic preferences
for certain locations, such that utility is equalized across location but wages are not. Local productivity
spillovers imply that total factor productivity depends on the pool of labor that works and lives in a
given location. Their framework can be applied to our environment by interpreting the onset of a SEZ as
a policy shock that reduces rmscosts in the treated locations. This induces rms to relocate or expand
their activity within the SEZ. Agglomeration externalities and technology transfer from foreign rms
(or from more productive Chinese rms that relocate to the SEZ) may increase total factor productivity.
The (possibly gradual) inow of rms is limited by congestion externalities, as new rms bid up the
prices for local factors such as land and labor. The higher costs o¤set the initial increase in prots,
providing an equilibrating mechanism. The dynamic adjustment eventually comes to a halt when rms
prots and workersutility are equalized across locations. In the new spatial equilibrium, total factor
productivity, the stock of capital and labor, and ultimately the GDP are permanently higher in the
SEZ.
14The real GDP index of cities is available from the NBS for the period 1996-2010. For this period, cities with a
SEZ had an average yearly ination rate of 1.8%, while cities without a SEZ had an average of 2.3%. The di¤erence
is not statistically signicant. We also run a panel regression of prices on the reform indicator and control for city and
province-year xed e¤ects. The estimate is -0.008 and insignicant.
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Guided by this model, we investigate, rst, if the onset of a SEZ triggers an increase in GDP and
GDP per capita relative to other cities. In a world of perfect capital and labor mobility, we should
expect a permanent increase in TFP, factor accumulation, and GDP while labor productivity (GDP
per capita) should eventually be equalized across locations. To the opposite, in a world with no labor
mobility GDP per capita would also be permanently higher in treated cities. In China, labor is not
immobile but migration is subject to frictions such as the hukou system. Thus, we test whether the
onset of a SEZ a¤ects both GDP (and its components) and GDP per capita. We defer the analysis of
the e¤ect of the policy on factor accumulation and TFP to Section 5 below.
4.2 Baseline Specication
In this section, we run regressions whose dependent variables are the logarithms of either GDP or GDP
per capita. When we run regressions for GDP, we do not control for changes in labor since these are
part of the outcome variable. When we run regressions using GDP per capita as the dependent variable,
we do control for population to account for decreasing returns to labor.15
The main explanatory variables are reform indicators switching on in the year after part of a citys
territory is granted the status of a state-level SEZ.16 All regressions control for city xed e¤ects and
province-time interaction dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. More formally, we
run regressions of the form
yipt = i + pt +  I_Reformit +Xit + "it; (1)
where yipt is the logarithm of nominal GDP or nominal GDP per capita, i is a city xed e¤ect, tp
is a province-time xed e¤ect, and I_Reformit is an indicator switching on, for each city, in the year
after a state-level SEZ is established. Xit is a vector of time-varying control variables and "it is a
normal error term. City xed e¤ects absorb time-invariant heterogeneity in city characteristics like
initial development or geographical location. Thus, the e¤ects of reforms are identied across city-time
within each province. Province-time xed e¤ects control for time-varying province-specic shocks that
can play a confounding role. In particular, they absorb cross-province ination di¤erentials.
The econometric specication in (1) restricts the treatment e¤ect to a shift in the after-reform
GDP (GDP per capita) level path; namely, in reformed cities the GDP per capita level (or trend) is
allowed to shift whenever the reform indicator switches on. Below, we explore more exible econometric
specications allowing for trend breaks and distributed lags.
The estimated coe¢ cients are shown in Table 3. In column (1), we include no additional control
variable except for the city xed e¤ects and province-time dummies. The coe¢ cient of the state-level
SEZ is positive and highly signicant. Becoming the host of a SEZ increases the average GDP of the
treated city by about 15.6% in post-reform years. In contrast, the e¤ect of province-level reforms is
small and insignicant. In column (2) we include the logarithm of the citys land area as a control. This
variable controls for changes in city borders, which are relatively frequent in China and would change
GDP mechanically.17 Increases in land area appear to be positively associated with aggregate GDP.
The estimated e¤ect of the SEZ decreases to about 11.6% but remains highly signicant.
15 In an earlier version, we also show results for GDP per capita if one does not control for population. The results are
qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 3.
16We also construct a similar separate dummy variable for province-level reforms. Note that including the year of the
reform in the dummy does not alter the baseline results signicantly.
17 In the robustness section 7.5 we discuss the results when instead of controlling for land area we allow for structural
breaks in the city xed e¤ects when there are border changes.
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In column (3) we show the results of regressions where GDP per capita is the outcome variable and
where we control for the logarithm of population.18 The estimated e¤ect of the reform is 9.27%.19 This
suggests that part of the increase in GDP is due to labor reallocation (something we document more
explicitly in Section 5 below). In columns (4)(6) we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of inland
provinces.20 This sub-sample involves a less discretionary selection of individual cities. To mitigate
concerns about the selection further, we exclude cities that were granted the status of SEZ in spite
of not being provincial capitals. Thus, the restricted inland sample only contains provincial capitals
(treatment group) and cities that were never granted the SEZ status (control group). Columns (4)
(6) in Table 3 show that the results are robust to restricting the sample to inland provinces.21 The
coe¢ cient of interest is positive and signicant, and even larger than in the full sample.
4.3 Pre-Reform Trends
A concern with the results of Table 3 is that cities hosting SEZ might already have been on a higher-
growth trajectory or might even have been selected precisely because of their promise of success. The
focus on inland capitals alleviates such concerns. However, the year in which capitals were assigned to
the treatment group may not be random. Moreover, provincial capitals may be a special group per se.
We address this point through a variety of strategies. First, we investigate whether the performance
of treated cities was di¤erent from that of other cities in the same province in the years shortly pre-
dating the reform. Table 4 is the analogue of Table 3, reporting the results of regressions where we
add four pre-reform indicators taking on the unit value, respectively, in the year of reform and one, two
and three years before the reform.22 If cities were granted the status of SEZ due to their promising
pre-reform trends, these coe¢ cients ought to be positive and signicant. In contrast, we nd the
estimated coe¢ cient of the pre-reform dummies to be mostly negative and insignicant. In column
(5) the indicators for the reform year and for one year before the reform are marginally signicant
but negative. The treatment e¤ect in the full sample continues to be positive and signicant (columns
(1)-(3)). In the inland sample the estimate is positive and signicant in column (4), and it is positive
but insignicant in columns (5)-(6). In summary, the results of Table 4 are reassuring and suggest that
treated cities did not show higher economic performance already before the reform.23
18The coe¢ cient on population size is negative, suggesting that an increase in the population size due, e.g., to immi-
gration, has a negative e¤ect on labor productivity.
19This specication in column (3) is equivalent to controlling for the logarithm of population density and land area. In
Section 7.5 we investigate the role of density in more detail, and we also discuss the concern that population and population
density could be endogenous. The results are robust to using lagged variables and alternative ways of controlling for border
changes.
20 In the sub-sample of inland cities, 44 cities were granted SEZ status. Of these, 18 were provincial capitals.
21Arguably, inland capitals are per se a special group. Since the selection of treated cities was based on an administrative
criterion (rather than on unknown, possibly heterogeneous criteria), we can better control for features making capital
cities di¤erent from the control group. In Section 4.4 we allow cities to have year xed e¤ects that depend on such city
characteristics, and we nd that the results are similar.
22We also explored longer lags. The lags for ve years prior to the reform are never signicant in the full sample. In the
inland sample some of the earlier lags become signicantly negative but only in the specication in column (4) that does
not control for changes in land area. Note that lags longer than three years are identied out of a signicantly smaller
set of reforming cities (since many cities were granted the SEZ status in the early 1990s, and our sample starts in 1988).
For instance, in the full (inland) sample the rst three lags are identied out of 75 (31) cities, while the fth lag would
only be identied out of 31 (18) cities.
23Note also that the earliest zones (for example the CSEZ) introduced before 1989, likely the most selected group, are
either excluded or exhibit no time-variation in the policy indicators in our sample period. Thus, they play no role in the
identication of the treatment e¤ect.
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Second, we consider a more exible specication allowing treated cities to have di¤erent time trends
from the non-reformers. This addresses the potential worry that in our baseline specication the positive
e¤ect of SEZ might arise spuriously due to the omission of pre-existing trends. The new specication
allows the GDP of cities that are hosting a SEZ to have a linear time trend that di¤ers from the control
groups trend already before the reform. In some specications, we even allow this trend to undergo
a structural break at the time when the reform indicator switches on. More formally, we consider the
following specication:
yipt = i + tp + 1I_Reformit + 2 [(t  1987) I_Reformeri] (2)
+ 3 [max f0; (t ReformY eari) I_Reformitg] +Xit + "it;
where, as above, I_Reformit is an indicator switching on in the rst year after the reform. Moreover,
 I_Reformeri is a dummy identifying cities that were reformed at any time. t  1988 denotes the
year of the observation. Therefore, 2 captures the steepness of a linear trend specic to reformers,
i.e., how many percentage points the growth rate di¤ers between reformers and non-reformers.
 ReformY eari is the year in which the rst SEZ was introduced in city i (if a city never became
a SEZ, then we let ReformY eari = 0). The interaction [(t ReformY eari) I_Reformit]
allows a di¤erential trend (i.e., a trend break) starting as of the introduction of the rst SEZ. The
coe¢ cient 3 measures the steepness of such a trend break.
 1 captures a level shift as in the baseline specication of Equation (1).
The results for the full and restricted (inland) samples are shown in Table 5, columns (1)(4) and
(5)(8), respectively. The results are robust to using GDP per capita as the dependent variable and
controlling for population. Columns (1) and (5) of Table 5 reproduce columns (2) and (5) of Table 3 for
comparison. In the regressions of columns (2) and (6) we add a linear trend specic to reformers. The
estimated coe¢ cient ^2 (time trend of reformers (state-level)) is statistically signicant in both the full
and the restricted sample. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient ^1 continues to be highly signicant in the full
sample, although much of the e¤ect is now absorbed by the trend. However, it becomes insignicant
in the restricted sample. The trend in columns (2) and (6) does not distinguish pre- and post-reform
periods. Thus, in columns (3) and (7) we allow a structural break in the trend of reformed cities, by
including max f0; (t ReformY eari) I_Reformitg in the regression. Interestingly, the estimated
coe¢ cient ^1 remains almost unchanged in the full sample and increases in the restricted sample.
Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cient of the pre-reform trend, ^2, decreases and becomes insignicant in
both samples. The post-reform trend, ^3; is positive but insignicant in the full sample and positive
and signicant in the inland sample. Altogether, the statistical specication studied so far suggests that
the baseline model with a GDP level shift performs better than one allowing for a trend break implying
a permanent GDP divergence between the treatment and control groups.
The specication of columns (2)(3) and (6)(7) allowing for permanently diverging paths may
be too extreme. We consider, then, an alternative specication allowing SEZ to have a non-linear e¤ect
of the SEZ relative to the pre-reform trend. To avoid an over-parameterization, we omit the level shift,
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and we estimate the following alternative econometric specication:24
yipt = i + tp + 2 [(t  1987) I_Reformeri] (3)
+ 3 [max f0; (t ReformY eari) I_Reformitg]
+4 [max f0; (t ReformY eari) I_Reformitg]2 +Xit + "it:
The regression results from this specication are provided in columns (4) and (8). In both cases, we
nd that ^3 > 0 and ^4 < 0; implying that the SEZ are associated with an acceleration of growth in
the immediate post-reform years, but that the acceleration dies o¤ in subsequent years. The coe¢ cients
are both individually and jointly statistically signicant in the full sample, while the square term is
negative but insignicant in the inland sample.25 In summary, this specication suggests that the e¤ect
of SEZ is a signicant gradual increase in the GDP level, rather than a permanent increase in growth
(i.e., a linear trend break of the treated cities after the reforms).26
4.4 Heterogeneous City Characteristics
In the previous section, we allow di¤erent trends between treated cities and non-reformers. An alterna-
tive strategy is to control for di¤erential trends associated with the initial characteristics of cities. This
is an important check, since Table 2 shows that cities hosting a SEZ were more populated and had a
higher initial development measured by GDP per capita than other cities. One might worry that the
heterogeneity in these initial characteristics might be the actual driver of economic performance over
time, and that our baseline specication might spuriously attribute those e¤ects to the establishment
of SEZ.
To address this concern, we interact each year dummy with the log di¤erence between certain city
characteristics and their respective median values in the year they were rst measured. We do this for
the city characteristics GDP per capita, population, population density, and number of universities and
include the interactions together in the regressions.27 This allows the exible growth path to depend
on citiesinitial characteristics and assumes this interaction to be log-linear.28
24 It would be possible to also include the term 1I_Reformit to this specication. However, it is very di¢ cult to
identify separately all the e¤ects in such a highly parameterized model. Therefore, we omit this term, and regard the
current specication as a non-nested alternative to Equation (2).
25 ^3 and ^4 are jointly signicant at 5% in the full sample and at 10% in the inland sample.
26Clearly, the quadratic model is not a correct specication itself, since it would imply a negative long-run e¤ect of
SEZ. Given the short sample, the data only capture the increasing part of the quadratic relation. See Section 4.5 for a
more general specication.
27We calculate for each year the median of the variables across all cities. When we restrict the regression sample to
inland provinces, then we calculate the di¤erence relative to the median in this restricted sample. Since our sample is an
unbalanced panel, the year in which cities appear in our sample can vary. However, the results are robust to restricting
the sample to a balanced panel of 172 cities. The sample size is reduced here because of missing data for the number of
universities, but the results are also robust to excluding the interactions with the initial number of universities and thus
using the larger sample.
28Consider for example a city i that enters our sample in 1988; and whose GDP p.c. is reported in the yearbook. The
interaction e¤ect between a year dummy (for example 1995) and the log di¤erence between GDP p.c. in 1988 and the
median in that year then is
D1995 

log(GDP1988;i)  log(GDP1988;median)

:
The estimate on this interaction would capture how much higher GDP p.c. is in 1995 for city i when the log di¤erence
changes by some percentage. Therefore, cities with median initial characteristics have a time path as given by the main
year dummies, and the interactions with initial characteristics allow di¤erential relative paths for cities above or below
the median.
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The results are shown in Panel A of Table 6. The coe¢ cients of interest are similar to Table 3 in
the full sample and larger in the inland sample. In both cases, they remain highly signicant. In Panel
B, we provide the results from an alternative specication where the year dummies are interacted with
a set of indicators for whether a city has a GDP per capita, population, population density, number
of universities, respectively, that is above the median in the year in which that variable rst appears
in the yearbooks for that city. The four sets of interaction e¤ects are then included together in the
regressions. The results of Panel A and Panel B are relatively similar.29
In summary, the e¤ects of SEZ are robust to controlling in a exible way for di¤erential trends
associated with heterogeneous initial conditions.
4.5 Event Study
In this section, we perform a non-parametric analysis of the e¤ects of the reform with the aid of a model
that imposes no functional form restrictions on post- (and pre-) reform e¤ects. All e¤ects are captured
by separate lag- or lead-specic dummies. More formally, we run the following regression:
yipt = i + t;p +
JFX
n= JB
nI
n
itf(t Reformyeari) = ng+Xit + "it; (4)
where positive values of t   Reformyeari measure how many years before year t city i became the
host of a SEZ. Negative values measure how many years ahead of t city i will be reformed. Note that
this specication allows us to identify some of the lagged e¤ects out of reforms that took place before
1988. For instance, a city that hosted its rst SEZ in 1984 will have variation for all leads ranging
from 4 to 26 years. In our baseline specication, instead, such a city would display no within variation,
and the reform indicator would be collinear with the city xed e¤ect. In our sample, the maximum
number of post-reform leads, JF ; is 26, corresponding to cities which hosted their rst SEZ in 1984.
We also construct these indicators for the year of reform and the three years prior to the reform (i.e.
JB = 3), so we can test whether reforming cities already had a signicantly di¤erent performance prior
to the establishment of the rst zone.30 The omitted categories (for which all indicators are zero) are
never-reforming cities and reformed cities more than three years before the reform. The controls include
the logarithm of land area and the usual set of xed e¤ects.
The results for GDP are displayed in Figure 3. The results for GDP per capita are shown in Figure
4 and will be discussed in Section 5 where we decompose the e¤ect. The graphs show the lead and
lagged e¤ects of the treatment n years after the reform (for instance, n=10 measures the e¤ect ten
years after the introduction of a SEZ). The upper graph in Figure 3 shows the e¤ect on GDP in the full
sample. This specication conrms the results of the previous section. In particular, there is a break
in the GDP path a year after the reform, followed by a temporarily higher growth rate that levels o¤
after about ten years. The size of the e¤ect is comparable to that in the previous section. There is only
some marginal, statistically insignicant evidence of a higher GDP growth in the three years before
the reform, indicating a possibility for some minor positive selection. Note that the standard errors
increase nineteen years after the establishment of the zone (corresponding to the vertical line added to
29The di¤erence between Panel A and B in the sample size is due to cities with zero universities in the rst year, such
that the log di¤erence in Panel A is not dened.
30For the same reasons described in the discussion of Table 4, we do not include more pre-reform indicators. When we
include also indicators for four and ve years prior to the reform, these indicators are marginally signicant, but identied
by only 27 observations.
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each gure). This is due to a signicant drop in the number of observations, since many cities were
reformed in 1991 and 1992.31
We estimate the same regression for the restricted sample of inland provinces (excluding cities which
had a reform but are not provincial capitals), see the lower graph in Figure 3. The qualitative pattern
and the point estimates are similar, although the estimation is less precise.32
4.6 Di¤erent Types of SEZ
In this section, we attempt to disentangle the e¤ects of the di¤erent types of state-level SEZ. To this
aim, we create separate post-reform indicators for each of the three most important (and most common)
SEZ: ETDZ, HIDZ, and EPZ. In addition, we create a single dummy for other types of state-level SEZ.
Appendix Table A2 has the same structure as Table 3 but replaces the indicator for any state-level
zone with the four separate indicators for each type of state-level SEZ. ETDZ and HIDZ individually
appear to have a signicant e¤ect on the level of GDP. In the full sample, the e¤ects of ETDZ and to
some degree also HIDZ are relatively similar to those of the rst zone in Table 3. The point estimates
on ETDZ and HIDZ in the inland sample are relatively similar to the full sample, but less precisely
estimated. The e¤ects of ETDZ and HIDZ in the inland sample tend to be lower than for the rst zone
reported in Table 3. EPZ are insignicant in both samples, while OtherTypes are mostly signicant
and have particularly large estimates in the inland sample.33 Overall, the disaggregation highlights the
relative importance of the ETDZ and HIDZ, which are the two largest and most comprehensive types
of zones in our sample, as well as those most explicitly emphasizing technology.
Since the e¤ects of any zone has been shown to build up gradually during about ten years and then
level o¤, we investigate whether the same pattern holds true for the individual types of zones. Since the
pre- and post-reform e¤ects of di¤erent types of zones often overlap (treated cities often had multiple
zones of di¤erent kinds), the approach in Section 4.5 is demanding. Nevertheless, the resulting picture
is reasonably clear. Figure A1, which can be found in the appendix, plots the coe¢ cients of the di¤erent
types of zones (estimated in the same regression) over the years since the reform. The rst panel shows
that the pattern for ETDZ looks remarkably similar to that of Figure 3 (rst zone reformed). The
second panel shows that HIDZ also display a concave pattern, although the e¤ect appears to decline
after lag 13. EPZ and OtherTypes show a more mixed picture (the two lower panels in Figure A1).34
The standard errors are large and the e¤ects are estimated imprecisely. In summary, most development
e¤ects appear to stem from ETDZ and HIDZ.35
31When the cities reformed in 1991 and 1992 reach the year 2010, the subsequent number of cities that identify the
individual coe¢ cients drops from 54 to 9. The vertical dashed line in the gure marks this drop.
32The reforms in the inland provinces started almost a decade later than in the coastal provinces. The post-reform
e¤ects are therefore estimated for a shorter period and based on fewer observations. In separate regressions not shown
here, we nd that if residuals are clustered at the provinceyears of reform (instead of city) level, the e¤ects after nine
years are mostly statistically signicant and positive in the inland sample. Two of the pre-reform indicators are also
signicant but negative.
33 It should be noted that the estimates on OtherTypes are based on few observations. 14 cities have a zone type other
than ETDZ, HIDZ, or EPZ, but in 11 of these the zone this is in conjunction with an ETDZ or HIDZ.
34The stark drop in OtherTypes is identied by only one observation. EPZ were established after 2000 and often inside
an existing zone. Furthermore, the EPZ may have gained importance after the WTO accession in 2001, which could
explain their upward trend (though insignicant).
35Recall that some zone types like ETDZ and HIDZ may target cities with certain characteristics such as having
universities. This could raise concerns about selection and we address this in a similar fashion as in Section 4.4. When
we include the interactions of year xed e¤ects with initial characteristics (GDP p.c., population, density, and number
of universities), then the estimates on these zone types are relatively similar. The two exceptions are that in column (5)
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5 Decomposing the E¤ects of SEZ
In this section, we investigate the channels through which the SEZ promote economic development by
decomposing the e¤ects on physical capital per capita, average human capital, population, and TFP.
To construct TFP, we assume the aggregate technology to be described by a Cobb-Douglas production
function in physical capital and e¢ ciency units of labor (raw labor  average human capital). We
use the local population size as a proxy for raw labor and the average years of schooling to measure
human capital (see appendix for details). The aggregate production function is estimated using an
OLS estimator from the panel of observations of output, capital, population, and average educational
attainment of the population, including city xed e¤ects and province-time xed e¤ects.36 We then use
the estimated parameters to compute (the logarithm of) TFP as the residual component.37
In panel A of Table 7, we display the results of baseline di¤erence-in-di¤erence regressions analogous
to those in Table 3, where, respectively, GDP per capita, capital-labor ratio, population, and human
capital are used as the dependent variables. In both the full sample (column (1)) and the inland sample
(column (5)), becoming the host of a state-level SEZ is associated with a signicant and positive increase
in the GDP per capita. This result is identical to that of columns (3) and (6) in Table 3. Columns
(2) and (6) show that the establishment of SEZ is associated with an increase in the capital-labor ratio
by 13.1% and 33.9% for the full and inland sample, respectively, both e¤ects being highly signicant.
Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) suggest that the SEZ have no signicant e¤ect on population and the human
capital measure in the China City Statistical Yearbook data. However, both e¤ects are positive and
signicant when one restricts the analysis to more precise population data from the decennial census,
as is shown in panel B in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6). Population increases by 9.7% and 11.1% after
the establishment of a SEZ in the full and the inland sample, respectively,38 while the average years
of schooling of the population above 6 increase by 0.18 years in the full sample and 0.36 years in the
inland sample.39 The increase in human capital can be explained by either selective immigration (i.e.,
cities with a SEZ attract more educated immigrants) or by stronger incentives for locals to accumulate
ETDZ becomes signicant while HIDZ loses signicance and that in column (6) ETDZ becomes signicant.
36The estimation of production functions can su¤er from simultaneity bias, because prot-maximizing rms choose
inputs after knowing the realization of productivity shocks, and selection bias, related to exit and survival of rms. In
the rm-level literature, it is common to use the correction proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). For example, Brandt et
al. (2012) nd that the TFP growth of Chinese rms is underestimated when the endogeneity bias is uncontrolled for.
Martin et al. (2011b) estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function using rm level data. They nd that after controlling
for simultaneity bias, TFP is still very close to the one obtained using a simple OLS estimation. Since we use aggregate
data, we follow the traditional approach and use an OLS estimator. This is related to the growth accounting literature
including Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005). See also Hsieh and Moretti (2015) for an application to city-level
data.
37More formally, we let
log TFPit = logYit   ^ logKit   ^  log (hitLit)  ^pt   ^i; (5)
where Yit is GDP, Kit is physical capital stock, hit is human capital, and Lit is population; ^ and ^ are the estimated
coe¢ cients of the Cobb-Douglas production function; ^pt is the estimated province-year dummy, and ^i is the esti-
mated city xed e¤ect capturing, respectively, province-level common trends and city-level time-invariant components of
productivity. TFPit measures the citytime variation in TFP.
38The di¤erence is likely due to non-hukou population which is captured in the census data but not in the yearbook
data. Since in panel A we compute population for the years in between the census based on the growth rate in the
yearbooks, the annual variation does not fully reect non-hukou migrants and is subject to measurement error. See also
robustness section 7.4, where we discuss the use of census data.
39 Ideally, we would prefer to use the educational attainment of the working population (age 25-64). However, this is
not available in the census. In Appendix Table A4 we break down the result by di¤erent educational levels. The most
salient e¤ect is the increase in the share of college graduates.
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human capital. Despite the higher population, GDP per capita increases after the introduction of a
SEZ because GDP increases more than population. This is shown for the census sample in columns (1)
and (3) in panel B.
The estimated e¤ect of SEZ on TFP is shown in panel C of Table 7. In the specication of columns
(1) and (4), TFP is estimated without imposing any restriction on the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas
production function. The unconstrained estimation of the production function yields output elasticities
of capital and labor of 0:3 and 0:6, respectively. In columns (2) and (5), we impose constant returns to
scale, obtaining elasticities of 0:35 and 0:65: Since there is some evidence that the labor share has been
declining in China (see Bai and Qian 2010), in columns (3) and (6) we estimate the production function
separately for pre- and post-1995 subperiods.40 In all specications of the full sample, the SEZ have a
positive and signicant e¤ect on TFP (columns (1)-(3)). As shown in columns (4)-(6), the estimated
e¤ects on TFP in the inland sample are positive but insignicant, except in column (6), where TFP is
estimated separately for pre- and post-1995 sub-samples.
Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of SEZ on GDP per capita, capital-labor ratio, human capital, and TFP,
respectively, as an event study. The e¤ects on GDP per capita and on the capital-labor ratio are concave
over time. Both paths feature a break one year after the reform. In particular, the e¤ects of SEZ on
GDP per capita and on the capital-labor ratio become statistically signicant around seven years after
the reform. There appears to be some concavity in the e¤ect on TFP as well, although less clearly and
not statistically signicant in the individual years. Human capital appears to be higher in cities with
SEZ (in this case, some e¤ects are already detected prior to the reform).
6 Spillovers
In this section we study whether the e¤ects of SEZ spill over to other locations. SEZ could have negative
spillovers on other cities if the policy attracts investments and workers away of other areas (beggar-
thy-neighbor e¤ect). Positive spillovers could accrue from the di¤usion of knowledge and an increase in
market access. Investigating the spillover e¤ects of the SEZ is important to assess the overall e¤ect of
SEZ on economic development. The existing literature on spillover e¤ects on non-treated locations is
ambiguous (see Neumark and Simpson (2015) for an overview of the evidence).
In order to estimate the spillovers of SEZ on other cities, we make the identifying assumption that
spillovers either positive or negative are decreasing in the distance from SEZ.41 This assumption is
motivated by the evidence documented in the previous literature that distance plays a crucial role for
spillovers. For example, Ja¤e et al. (1993) and Keller (2002) nd that spillover of knowledge signicantly
decreases with geographic distance.42 We consider various alternative measures of geographical distance
(as described below) in order to test the robustness of our results. To estimate the spillovers based on
these distance measures, we rst assume that the spillovers decay log linearly in distance from the closest
SEZ. We then use a non-parametric approach based on various distance bands and more comprehensive
40The result is similar when we split the sample into a pre- and post-2000 period.
41This is consistent, among others, with Rosenthal and Strange (2004). Geographic distance (or transportation costs)
plays also a central role in the literature on trade and economic geography (Fujita et al. 1999). An alternative measure
of distance is used by Bloom et al. (2013) who argue that cross-rm spillovers depend on the distance in technology and
product markets. Neumark and Kolko (2010) also use the identication assumption that the e¤ect of place-based policy
on non-targeted areas di¤ers in the distance to the treated areas.
42Ja¤e et al. (1993) nd that patent citations are highly spatially clustered, which implies that there is a distance decay
in the knowledge di¤usion. Keller (2002) nds that the benet of technology spillover is halved with a distance of 1200
kilometers.
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measures of exposure to other citiesSEZ. As provincial borders may act as barriers, we also compare
our results when restricting to spillovers within provincial borders. It is important to note that all of
these variables are time-varying because they depend on the introduction of SEZ in other cities. Thus,
identication hinges on this time variation. Note also that we always include the cities own policy
indicator for SEZ in the regression. This allows us to test whether the own reform e¤ect changes when
we allow for spillovers from other cities.
6.1 Measures of Distance and Transportation Costs Between Cities
Our rst and simplest measure of distance between cities is the geodesic kilometer distance between
all the city centers in our sample. This measure does not take into account geographical barriers
between cities or transportation infrastructure. The second measure of distance is the driving time
between cities derived from Google Maps.43 The advantage of this measure is that it captures how well
cities are connected through road infrastructure, which is likely to be an important determinant of the
interactions between them. The drawback is that it focuses on road transportation and that it is based
on the current transportation network, which is potentially endogenous to the zone locations.
The third set of distance measures is based on the topography of the Chinese terrain. This has the
important advantage of being entirely based on exogenous factors. We have detailed information on
slope and land cover that allows us to construct a local measure of transportation costs on 10  10
kilometer cells throughout China. We then use a shortest-path algorithm in ArcGIS to nd the shortest
route between cities through this cost surface and we measure the total cost along this route.44 Since
we must make a number of assumptions for how to map slope into transportation costs, we investigate
the robustness of the result to alternative ways to compute this measure. The rst mapping of terrain
slope to driving speeds is based on a scale that relates slope to driving speed in the US and has 10
di¤erent levels (AASHTO 2001). The second mapping is based on a similar scale for China and has 7
di¤erent levels. In a further variation of this approach, we use a higher resolution for the transport cost
cells (3 km instead of 10 km), and we exclude larger water bodies. All measures based on topography
are normalized so that they have the same median as the driving times according to the Google maps.
This is to facilitate comparisons between the di¤erent specications.45
6.2 Results on Spillover E¤ects Across Cities
We use three complementary empirical strategies.
Distance to closest SEZ Our rst approach to estimate SEZ spillovers is based on the distance of
each city from the closest city hosting a SEZ (excluding zones in the own city). This variable varies
over time; the establishment of a new SEZ that is closer than the previous ones causes a reduction in
this measure. Our regression equation is as follows:
yipt = i + pt + I_Reformit +  ln(DistClosestZoneit) +Xit + "it;
43We use the tool traveltime3 in Stata that accesses the Google maps. Since only a limited number of queries can
be submitted and there are more than 75000 routes, we measured the distance of each bilateral connection in only one
direction and imposed symmetry.
44The tool in ArcGIS is cost distance and is an implementation of the Dijkstra algorithm. See for example Alder (2015)
for a description of this method and the data.
45We assume that all distance measures have a linear relationship with e¤ective transport costs. While this is only an
approximation, it facilitates the comparison across the various distance measures.
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where DistClosestZoneit is the distance to the closest city that has a state-level SEZ in year t. The
distance to the next SEZ is an inverse measure of the spillover intensity. Therefore, if spillovers were
negative, we would expect  > 0. On the contrary, the results in Panel A of Table 8 suggest that
there are positive spillovers, since a longer distance to the next SEZ is associated with a lower GDP,
controlling for land area and the usual xed e¤ects. The spillovers are especially large in the inland
sample. Remarkably, the reform e¤ect of the own SEZ, , remains large and signicant.
Indicator for SEZ within radius Our second approach is to include a binary indicator for having
a zone within a given radius. We report the results for a 150 kilometer radius (or for the equivalent in
driving time).46 The regression equation is
yipt = i + pt + I_Reformit + I_ReformRadiusit +Xit + "it;
where I_ReformRadiusit is the indicator for having another city with a SEZ within the specic radius.
If spillovers were negative, we would expect  < 0. Instead, we typically nd positive estimates of :
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results for a radius in kilometers and minutes in columns (1) and
(2), respectively. The remaining columns use the distance measures based on topography, which are
normalized such that their median is equal to the median travel time in minutes. All estimates are
positive, although the estimated coe¢ cients are sometimes insignicant.
We also perform a similar analysis where, instead of one indicator for 150 kilometers, we simulta-
neously include multiple indicators for various rings (excluding the own zone): 0-50, 50-100, 100-200,
and 200-400. These indicators take on the value 1 if there is at least one zone within the corresponding
ring. The omitted group consists of cities for which the closest SEZ is more than 400 kilometers (or the
corresponding alternative distance measures based on driving time or topography) away. The results are
shown in Appendix Table A5. Most of the indicators have a positive coe¢ cient, and in some cases they
are statistically signicant. We only observe negative coe¢ cients for the geodesic distance beyond 50
kilometers, but the estimates are relatively small and insignicant. For all other distance measures, we
nd positive e¤ects that tend to be larger and more signicant for zones that are closer. This analysis
suggests that the positive spillover e¤ects of the zones on cities within a radius of up to 100 kilometers
is not driven by reallocation from areas between 100 and 400 kilometers.
Exposure measure Our nal spillover measure is inspired by Briant et al. (2015) and mimics the
idea of a market access measure such as47
MAit =
X
j 6=i
GDPj;t
dist(i; j)
: (6)
We adjust this measure by summing only over cities that have a SEZ in that year.48 Our measure of
exposure to other cities with SEZ is therefore given by
Bit =
X
j 6=i
GDPj;t
dist(i; j)
IfI_Reformj;t = 1g;
46This is approximately the median distance to the next SEZ. The results are similar for a radius of 100. The coe¢ cients
vary more when we use a variety of di¤erent radii between 20 and 900 km, but we never nd signicant negative spillover
e¤ects. In robustness checks, we also computed the distance to the closest zone in the same province, and the results are
qualitatively similar.
47Such measures of market access or market potential appear in models of trade and economic geography, see for
example Fujita et al. (1999).
48Briant et al. (2015) weigh by population instead of GDP. The results are robust to using population.
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where IfI_Reformj;t = 1g is an indicator function for cities that have a SEZ (are reformed) at time t.
This measure allows us to capture the exposure by taking into account both the economic size of other
cities with SEZ and the distance from them.
This exposure measure varies over time because of the introduction of SEZ in other cities, but also
because of GDP growth in these cities. The latter channel implies the risk that this measure may
confound the e¤ect of other zones with growth in market access.49 In order to control for growth
in neighboring cities in general, we therefore also control for the logarithm of market access, which
is measured across all cities in our sample as shown in Equation (6). The regression equation then
becomes
yipt = i + pt + I_Reformit +  ln(Bit) +  ln(MAit) +Xit + "it:
We would typically expect a positive coe¢ cient on market access and, in the presence of negative
spillover e¤ects, a negative coe¢ cient on the exposure to other SEZ, hence  < 0 and  > 0. The results
are shown in Appendix Table A6. The coe¢ cients on exposure are always positive but not signicant.
The measure of market access shows a negative estimate in the full sample and a positive estimate in
the inland sample. However, it is generally insignicant except for column (1). The result is broadly
consistent with the one from the two previous specications, and it indicates that there is no evidence
of negative spillovers. The comparison to the market access measure in fact suggests that proximity to
a reformed city is more benecial than higher market access in general. Interestingly, the e¤ect of the
own zone remains large and signicant in all specications.
The analysis of potential spillover e¤ects based on various distance measures and identication
strategies suggests the existence of positive spillovers across cities. Although these e¤ects are not always
signicant, the fact that we never nd signicant negative e¤ects provides strong evidence against the
presence of negative spillovers.
6.3 Spillovers Over Time
In Section 4.5, we observed that the e¤ect of SEZ on the own city tends to atten out over time (see
Figure 3). One possible explanation for this pattern could be that the e¤ect of the SEZ spills over to
other cities as time goes by. In this section we investigate how the spillover e¤ects evolve over time.
The two upper graphs in Figure 5 show the estimates of a regression where the spans of the own SEZ
are included in a regression together with the spans of the rst zone that is established within 150
minutes driving time. The two lower graphs show the results from an analogous specication with a
150 kilometer radius. The point estimates on the spans for the neighboring zone generally become
signicant at the 5% level when a 150 minutes driving time radius is used, but not (or only marginally
so) when a 150 kilometer radius is used. In both cases the patterns suggest that the spillover e¤ects
become stronger during the rst ten years. The di¤usion of positive spillovers could reduce the di¤erence
between treated and neighboring cities, which can potentially explain why the e¤ect of the own zone
attens out over the years.
49For example, if several cities in the close neighborhood experience GDP growth but only one of them has a SEZ, then
this measure of exposure may partly capture the general increase in market access. Although we control for province-time
interactions in all of our regressions and therefore absorb much of the regional growth trends, this measure gives higher
weight to close neighbors and hence may capture spatial trends at the local level.
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6.4 Decomposition of Spillover E¤ects
In this section, we decompose spillovers into investment, TFP, and population spillovers. Negative
investment spillovers would indicate that the SEZ attract investments at the expense of neighboring
cities. Positive investment spillovers would instead arise if rms choose to locate geographically close to
their suppliers and customers. This would lead to higher investments in cities located near to growing
SEZ. A similar argument applies to population and TFP. If innovative rms are attracted by the SEZ,
this could yield a negative selection in nearby cities and lower TFP. Conversely, technological di¤usion
could induce positive spillovers. This could in turn trigger more investments in nearby cities.
Appendix Table A7 shows that the spillover e¤ects on investment are insignicant in the full sample
(columns (1)(4)). The point estimates are small and depending on the distance measure either
positive or negative. In the inland sample (columns (5)(8)), the spillovers tend to be more signicant
and are always positive (since the e¤ect of distance is negative). Appendix Table A8 shows that the
spillovers in TFP are in all cases positive and mostly signicant.50 The coe¢ cient on the indicator of
a citys own SEZ remains stable. Appendix Table A9 shows that the e¤ect of SEZ on population in
nearby cities is positive, but usually not signicant.51
One possible channel for productivity spillovers is foreign direct investment (see Gorodnichenko et
al. 2014), an explicit target of SEZ. Appendix Table A10 shows that the onset of SEZ increases the
FDI ows to the cities hosting SEZ, consistent with the results of Wang (2013). The spillover e¤ect on
neighboring cities is positive but insignicant. There is no evidence that SEZ have negative spillover
e¤ects on FDI in other cities.52
6.5 Spillover E¤ects in the Periphery of Cities
We have so far investigated cross-city spillover e¤ects. Our data additionally allow us to explore the
e¤ect of SEZ on neighboring non-urban areas. Our baseline specication focuses on the entire area
of cities, which include an urban core (where all state-level SEZ in our sample were established) and
the periphery around the urban core. To investigate whether and how SEZ a¤ect economic activity in
the area surrounding the center, we re-run our baseline regressions of Section 4.2, using two distinct
geographical denitions of GDP as the dependent variables. First, we use the logarithm of GDP of
the urban core only as the dependent variable (see Appendix Table A11, Panel A).53 Then, we use the
logarithm of GDP of the periphery only, i.e. excluding the urban core (Appendix Table A11, Panel B).
The e¤ects for the urban core are comparable in magnitude to those obtained above for the combined
area. Moreover, the results hold up when we consider only the periphery. In summary, there is no
evidence that SEZ impoverished neighboring non-core city areas.54
50Here TFP is constructed using the full-sample unrestricted production function estimation. The other two measures
of TFP give similar results.
51When we restrict the sample to the years when we have better population data from the census, then the signs of the
coe¢ cients vary and they are never signicant.
52Di¤erent from us, Wang (2013) nds some evidence of negative FDI spillovers in neighboring cities. A potential
explanation for the di¤erence in the results is that she does not distinguish between state-level and province-level zones
and only considers the spillover e¤ect of FDI on neighboring cities.
53The strategy of estimating the e¤ects at di¤erent levels of aggregation in order to verify the presence of spillovers
from the treated location to neighboring areas is also applied in Criscuolo et al. (2012) in their analysis of place-based
policies in the UK.
54The positive e¤ect may be due to rms active in SEZ setting up facilities in the periphery. To the extent to which
rms do not benet from special exemptions for the activities performed outside of the SEZ, we regard this as as a
spillover. However, one might conjecture that rms located inside the SEZ can benet from special treatment even if they
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7 Robustness
In this section we perform a number of robustness exercises.
7.1 Satellite Light as an Alternative Measure of GDP
Chinese price data are generally regarded as problematic, especially at the local level. Our empirical
methodology has the advantage of not relying on any price deator. Di¤erences in price levels are
ltered out by city xed e¤ects, whereas province  year xed e¤ects lter out cross-province ination
di¤erentials. Yet, one might worry that within each province cities might experience di¤erent ination
rates. In particular, our estimated treatment e¤ect would be biased upwards if the establishment of a
SEZ causes systematically higher ination. The existing price data do not suggest any such pattern.
However, one might also worry that the local authorities over-report the nominal GDP in cities hosting
SEZ, in order to meet the expectation of the central government regarding their success.
To address this issue, in this section we use light intensity measured by weather satellites as a
proxy for GDP. A number of recent papers have argued that nighttime light intensity measured by
weather satellites is a good proxy for GDP.55 Most economic activities such as production, transport,
and consumption produce light as a by-product. Therefore, light intensity is positively correlated with
the intensity of local economic activity. We calculate the average light intensity within the geographical
boundaries of the urban cores and use this as a proxy for economic activity. The light data has the
advantage that it can be measured within the same administrative boundaries over time. We can use
digital maps from 2010 to calculate the light statistics for all years. The change in administrative
borders which are relatively frequent for urban cores are therefore not a concern.56 A drawback of
the light data is that it is only available from 1992 on.
In column (1) of Table 9 we re-run our baseline regression with the logarithm of the average light
intensity as the dependent variable. The estimate suggests that SEZ have a positive and signicant
e¤ect on economic activity as measured by light intensity. However, the point estimate of about 5%
is lower than what we observed in the baseline regressions using GDP as the dependent variable. The
point estimate for the inland sample is similar in magnitude, albeit statistically insignicant. The lower
point estimate could be due to the sample period starting in 1992, because only one-third of the (rst)
SEZ were established after that year. Moreover, even for later reformers we lose annual observations
that would be useful for a precise estimation of the within-city e¤ect of the establishment of a SEZ.57
We also check the robustness of our results by using electricity consumption as a proxy of economic
activity (see, e.g., Rawski 2001). Data on electricity consumption by households and rms are reported
in the same statistical yearbooks as GDP and are available only for the urban core. In column (3)
locate some facilities in neighboring areas. We could not nd any precise information in this regard.
55Elvidge et al. (1997) are among the rst to discuss the relationship between light and economic activity. See also
Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and the literature cited there on the use of light to measure
economic activity. Ma et al. (2012) and Hälg (2012) discuss the use of light data for Chinese cities. See also the Online
Appendix for further details on the data source.
56When there are no data constraints due to border changes, then the urban core is a reasonable unit of analysis, since
the SEZ in our sample were located in the urban cores. The analysis using light data exploits this advantage, but we have
also done the analysis for the larger denition of a city that includes the periphery, which is the unit that the baseline
GDP results are based on. The e¤ects of SEZ at that level are smaller and insignicant. We have no explanation for the
di¤erence in the result between urban core and the area that includes the periphery. It appears to be specic to the light
data, since such large di¤erences were not observed for other data.
57This loss of precision is conrmed by the observation that if we run the baseline regression of Section 4.2 with GDP as
the dependent variable for the post-1992 period we obtain a positive (0.043) but statistically insignicant point estimate.
24
of Table 9 we re-run our baseline regression using the logarithm of electricity consumption as the
dependent variable. The result shows that the establishment of a SEZ is associated with a 15.7%
increase in electricity consumption.58
7.2 Controlling for Local Government Spending and Road Infrastructure
One might conjecture that the establishment of a SEZ may be associated with additional transfers
from the central or the provincial government. SEZ may also have triggered government investments
in infrastructure. Although one might regard both transfers and investments in infrastructure as being
part of the place-based policy, one may be interested in estimating the net e¤ects after controlling for
them.
While we have no information on transfers, we observe the area of nished roads in the urban cores
in each year, which is an important component of infrastructure investments. Furthermore, we observe
the overall expenditures of the local government for a subset of the years in our sample. Finally, we can
also control for government income and hence the decit of the local government. These measures can
be used as a proxy for the contribution of public investments to GDP. The disadvantage of including
these variables is twofold. First, we lose some observations. Second, causation could run in the opposite
direction: government expenditure might have increased because the GDP expansion caused by the
SEZ increased the tax revenue accruing to the local authorities. We have therefore also used one-year
lags of government spending and income. The estimates reported below are for the contemporaneous
years, but the results are relatively similar when using lags.
Table 10 shows that the reform e¤ects are robust to the inclusion of controls for local road in-
frastructure (columns (1) and (4)) and government expenditure (columns (2) and (5)). The results are
also robust to controlling for the log di¤erence between government spending and government income
a proxy for the decits of local governments (columns (3) and (6)). The e¤ect of the reform remains
positive and highly signicant in both samples.
7.3 Earlier GDP Data
Our main analysis focuses on the period 1988-2010, for which the NBS provides a sample of cities
that allows us to also track border changes over the years.59 This approach entails the cost of losing
variation in the reform variable, since some SEZ were established before 1988. We re-estimate our
baseline specication for a subset of cities for which GDP is also available for earlier years.60 In this
case, we cannot control for changes in land area, government spending, and population as these data
are missing for the earlier years. The reform e¤ect estimated with this subsample is a 16.8% increase in
the level of GDP in the full sample, and the estimated coe¢ cient is highly signicant. This estimate is
58However, we nd no signicant e¤ect in the inland sample. We suspect that this is due to the poor quality of electricity
data in this subsample, for which we have no explanation. We calculated the correlation between GDP and electricity
separately in four sub-samples: inland reformers, inland non-reformers, coastal reformers and coastal non-reformers. The
correlation is high and signicant in all subsamples except for that of inland reformers, where the elasticity of GDP with
respect to electricity is very low (0.02) and statistically insignicant. Interestingly, the correlation between GDP and
satellite light intensity is instead consistent and signicant across the four sub-samples, suggesting that the source of the
problem is not the GDP statistics but rather the electricity data.
59 It is important to note here that the city size could vary over time, and there were changes in the administrative
system. The yearbooks allow us to match the city names over the years and control for these border changes by including
land area as an explanatory variable.
60Please see the Online Appendix B for more detailed descriptions of the data source.
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similar to our baseline results reported in Table 3. In the inland sample, the estimate is 32.7%, which
is higher than our baseline result.
7.4 Population from Census
In our analysis so far, we have combined population data from the census and from the City Statistical
Yearbooks. Using the yearbook data allowed us to calculate the annual uctuations for the years between
the three censuses (1990, 2000, and 2010). To the best of our knowledge, the yearbook data cover only
the registered population in the city, that is, people with hukou.The existence of a large number of
non-resident immigrant workers in the cities could potentially bias our estimation. To address this issue,
we rst check the City Statistical Yearbook data against the population census that in principle should
record the entire resident population at the city level. We nd that there is a gap between the two
data sources. In particular, if the census is correct, then the population growth rate is overestimated by
an annual 24 basis points in non-reforming cities, and underestimated by 35 basis points in reforming
cities in the city statistics. The observation that the population is underestimated in the treatment
group and overestimated in the control group is not surprising, as the treatment cities are likely to have
attracted many non-hukou workers from the control group.
By relying on the census data in 1990, 2000, and 2010 and using the yearbook data only to infer the
population growth rates for the years in between, we have already attempted to address this concern.
To further test the robustness of our results, we repeat the baseline, regressions of Table 3 and restrict
our sample to the three census years, using only population census data. Table A3 simply replicates
the results in Table 3 for the restricted sample. The estimates are somewhat larger compared to our
baseline and they remain signicant. This is the case for all specications and in both samples. It is
important to note that by restricting the sample to only three years, we lose some time variation in the
treatment e¤ect. However, the baseline results do appear to be robust to using the resident population
data from the census.61
7.5 Population and Population Density
Our results suggest that SEZ have a positive e¤ect on both GDP and population, but the e¤ect on
GDP is larger than the e¤ect on population. This is consistent with the increase in GDP per capita
shown in columns (3) and (6) of Tables 3 and A3. These specications for GDP per capita also control
for population in order to account for agglomeration e¤ects, but this raises the concern that population
is endogenous. For instance, an increase in productivity and wages can induce immigration. The
typical instruments proposed in the literature are time-invariant, and it is di¢ cult to nd time-varying
instruments that t in our di¤erence-in-di¤erence framework.62 To mitigate the concern, we adopt
two strategies. First, we show that the results are robust to a specication where we use the lagged
61The same holds true for the capital-labor ratio and for TFP (result not shown).
62The literature nds a relatively small endogeneity bias in the coe¢ cient for population density. For example, Combes
and Gobillon (2015) document that the endogeneity bias on the elasticity of density is between 10% and 20%, sometimes
the bias is close to zero and even negative. Combes et al. (2010) provide a detailed comparison of di¤erent identication
strategies. In particular, they note how di¢ cult it is to nd valid time-varying instruments (most attempts in the existing
literature have resulted in weak instrumentation). An example for time-invariant instruments is given in Ciccone and
Hall (1996), who study the e¤ect of density by using historical population as an instrument. Combes et al. (2008),
Duranton and Puga (2004), and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) provide a more general discussion of spatial concentration
and productivity. An example of an analysis of agglomeration forces in China is Combes et al. (2013), who use Chinese
household survey data.
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values instead of current values of population (and its density). The results in the Appendix Table A12
show that the reform e¤ects on GDP per capita and TFP are robust when we include population or
population density together with land area with one period lag. The results are also robust to using
the lagged population (and its density) as an instrument for current population (and its density).63
Second, we explore other specications where we do not control for population (so, the results are
gross of agglomeration e¤ects). Column (2) in the baseline regression of Table 3 already shows that the
results are robust to a specication that includes changes in city areas but not in population. However,
one might worry that a specication where the e¤ect of border changes is log linear in land area is
overly restrictive. Changes in land areas reect changes in borders, and the e¤ects are likely to be
heterogeneous across cities. To address this concern, we propose a specication that controls for border
changes in a more exible way by allowing each citys xed e¤ect to undergo a structural break whenever
the land area of a city changes in our data - indicating a change in city borders. In other words, we
replace city xed e¤ects with city-land area xed e¤ects.64 For instance, if a border change brings a
poorer periphery into the city, this e¤ect is absorbed by the new, and more exible xed e¤ects. The
results are shown in Appendix Table A13. Columns (1) (2) for GDP show that the point estimates
are similar to Table 3 both in the full sample and the inland sample. Columns (3) (4) show that the
estimates are also positive for TFP. In the inland sample the estimate is also positive but lower than in
column (4) of Table 7 (Panel C) and marginally insignicant.
7.6 Heterogeneity in the Treatment E¤ect
The literature on place-based policies suggests that the e¤ectiveness of such policies may vary with
location characteristics such as city size, density, or market access (see for example Briant et al. 2015
or Devereux et al. 2007). In this section, we include in our baseline specication interaction terms of
our reform indicators with indicators for whether initial population, population density, GDP p.c., and
market access were above the median value of reformers.65 Since our sample is unbalanced, we take
as the initial year for each city the year in which the corresponding variable is reported the rst time
in our sample. The results are shown in Appendix Table A14. In the full sample there is evidence for
interaction e¤ects with population and population density, but the main e¤ect remains positive and
signicant. In the inland sample the interaction e¤ects are stronger and the main e¤ect is reduced when
including the interaction with population and population density. Interestingly, the interaction e¤ect
with initial GDP per capita is negative, suggesting that SEZ in relatively less developed capital cities
were particularly e¤ective in inland provinces.
7.7 Placebo Analysis
Our estimation exploits both the time and spatial variation in the establishment of SEZ. Since the
establishment of the SEZ is staggered, but clustered in a few years, there could be a concern about
the extent to which the exact timing of the reform matters for the identication of the reform e¤ect.
Furthermore, we would like to rule out that our reform indicators pick up shocks unrelated to SEZ
63See for example Martin et al. (2011b) for a panel analysis where lagged variables are used as instruments.
64An average city then has roughly three di¤erent xed e¤ects over the years because of changes in the land area
variable.
65We compare the characteristics to reformer cities because for some variables all reformers are above the median, such
that the interaction e¤ect would be collinear with the main e¤ect.
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that could be present also in other cities. In order to deal with these concerns, we run three placebo
exercises based on the specication in column (3) of Table 3, but assign reform years randomly.
In a rst exercise, we assign the actual number of new zone establishments in each year to a random
selection of cities. The resulting placebo distribution is the same as the true distribution over time, but
SEZ are assigned articially to random cities. We repeat this exercise 1000 times. We nd that in no
case are the absolute t values and the R-squared of the placebo regressions larger than those of the true
reform.66 This suggests that the spatial distribution of SEZ indeed drives our result.
In a second more demanding placebo test, we assign the random reforms only to reformers, again
holding the distribution of reforms across years constant. However, the timing of the treatment is
scrambled across cities. This allows us to assess the extent to which the time dimension of the reform
matters, because we are only randomizing the year of the reform but not the treated city. We nd that
the absolute t-values are higher when using the year of the true reform than in the placebo regressions
in all but 5% of the cases.67 This indicates that the actual year in which the SEZ were implemented is
critical for our results, and supports our identication strategy based on within-city variation.
Finally, we use the random assignment of reforms from above and include the true reform year and
the placebo reform year in the same regression.68 While the estimate for the true reform is always
signicant at 5%, the placebo reforms are signicant in only 33% of the cases. Overall, these placebo
exercises strengthen our condence in the empirical strategy used. Both the spatial and the temporal
variation of the SEZ appear to be important for the results.
7.8 E¤ects by Year of Reform
In Section 4.5 we allowed the e¤ect of SEZ to depend on the number of years since the reform. However,
the reform e¤ect may also depend on the year in which a city received the SEZ. Late SEZ could for
instance imply a less intense treatment, since the Chinese economy was altogether more liberalized
than in earlier periods. In this section we investigate whether there are signicant di¤erences between
early and late SEZ. To this aim, we rst construct separate policy indicators for early and late SEZ
introductions. We use 1992 as the threshold year after which we label SEZ as latereforms. Note that
1992 is the median reform year in our sample. The policy indicators for early and late reforms are then
used together in our baseline regression to replace the single indicator for reform. Table A15 columns
(1) and (4) show the results with the two indicators. Early and late reformers both show positive point
estimates, but the e¤ect of the early reformers is larger and more precisely estimated. This is true for
both the full sample and the inland sample, although the di¤erence is smaller in the inland sample.
This could suggest that earlier reforms had a larger impact, but it could also be driven by the fact that
for earlier reformers the e¤ect had more time to accumulate over the years since the reform. This seems
particularly relevant in light of the patterns we observe for the exible reform e¤ects in Section 4.5,
which suggest that the reform e¤ect accumulates over about ten years. We then test for this pattern
separately for early and late reformers in order to investigate how reform e¤ects may di¤er between
early and late reformers.
We parameterize the pattern we found in Section 4.5 by allowing a linear increase during ten years
66The mean estimate of the placebo reform is 0.0003, and is never signicant and higher than the one of the true reform.
67The mean estimate of this placebo reform is 0.0911. In only 13% of the draws does the placebo specication yield
signicant coe¢ cients that are higher than the actual coe¢ cients.
68The assignment of random reform years among reformers implies that a placebo reform year is likely to coincide with
the true reform year. This is the case in 36% of the draws.
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and then a constant e¤ect during all following years.69 Furthermore, we impose that the linear trend
after ten years is equal to the constant e¤ect after ten years. More precisely, we impose the restriction
that 11 30 = 10  trend, where 11 30 is the e¤ect after ten years and trend is the coe¢ cient
on the linear time trend. We then run this regression separately for early and late reformers. The
results are shown in Table A15 columns (2)(3) and columns (5)(6) for the full sample and the inland
sample, respectively. We see that the pattern in the full sample is relatively similar for early reformers
(column (2)) and late reformers (column (3)), but the coe¢ cients are less precisely estimated for the
late reformers. In the inland sample (columns (5)(6)) we observe that the coe¢ cients on the trend
are similar but again less precisely estimated for late reformers. We also note that in the inland
sample we cannot identify the e¤ect after ten years for the late reformers because there were no SEZ
established in the inland sample within the period 19932010. The lower precision for late reformers
is not surprising, since there are fewer observations to identify the e¤ect until the end of the sample.
However, these specications suggest that the patterns and broad magnitudes are comparable for early
and late reformers.
7.9 Alternative Clustering Strategies
In our main analysis we cluster standard errors at the city level, to allow for observations within a given
city to be correlated as well as for heteroskedasticity. Our results are robust to alternative clustering
strategies. First, we cluster the standard errors by province and year of reform (i.e., the rst year
in which a city hosts a SEZ). This strategy takes account of the fact that the introduction of SEZ is
highly clustered in time. Many HIDZ were introduced in 199192, and many ETDZ were introduced
in 200103, implying that di¤erent cities in these years cannot be treated as independent observations.
The baseline results (not shown but available upon request) are essentially unchanged, and in some
cases the statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients of interest is even strengthened.
We also run the regressions clustering standard errors at the province level (instead of provinceyear
of rst reform). This strategy is even more demanding, and runs into potential problems since we have
only 28 provinces in the full sample and 18 provinces in the inland sample, and so the number of clusters
is small. The results are robust to even this demanding approach. The coe¢ cients of interest remain
signicant, although in the inland sample for GDP per capita only at 10%.
8 Conclusion
The place-based industrial policy is a building block of the development strategy pursued by the Chinese
government. According to Naughton (2007): Bold, fragmented, open to outside investment, but with
a strong role for government: Special Economic Zones typify much of the Chinese transition process
(p. 410). This paper estimates the e¤ect of SEZ on local economic performance. The results suggest
that the establishment of SEZ has yielded large positive e¤ects on GDP and GDP per capita for the
cities in which these were located. Although our estimates are smaller than those found by the earlier
literature based on cross-sectional growth regressions (typically on a smaller set of cities and years), the
e¤ects are sizeable and robust. We also nd that the SEZ generated positive spillovers to neighboring
areas.
What can we learn from the Chinese experience about the role of economic reform and industrial
policy during the process of development? Existing theoretical and empirical work suggests that policies
69The fully exible specication with separate indicators for each year is very demanding, and yields imprecise estimates.
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and institutions should be appropriate to the stage of development, and particularly to the stage of
the process of technological convergence (Acemoglu et al. 2006, Lorenz et al. 2016). The Chinese
reform process was characterized by a mixture of elements of market liberalization and an active role
of the government in promoting investment and technology adoption. Rodrik (2006) argues that the
active role of the government was crucial for Chinas development because it supported a fast move
towards more modern and productive sectors which have positive externalities on the whole economy.
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that the industrial policy may have indeed been a catalyst
of the development process. At the same time, the estimated e¤ects are quantitatively not very large
relative to the high growth rates experienced by China in this period.
Our analysis is subject to a number of limitations that we leave to future work to address. First,
cities assigned to SEZ were not randomly allocated. To alleviate concerns for endogeneity, we focus on
a subsample of inland cities where the allocation was driven by rigidly selected criteria, and we compare
pre- vs. post-reform trends in treated cities. However, ideally one would like to have valid instruments
for the spatial and time distribution of the policy intervention. This is very hard to nd in the context
of Chinese SEZ.
Second, we did not attempt a proper assessment of the welfare e¤ect of SEZ. On the one hand, this
would require a quantication of the budgetary costs of the policy. On the other hand, the local gains
from spillovers through the agglomeration of labor may be partially o¤set by losses in other locations
that experience an outow of rms. As pointed out in Greenstone et al. (2010) and Kline and Moretti
(2014a), whether the gains o¤set the losses depends on the shape of the agglomeration force.
Third, it would be interesting to disentangle which of the di¤erent components of the policy package
had the largest e¤ects. While the reduction in tax wedges must have been important, there are other
channels through which SEZ may a¤ect local and regional outcomes. As discussed in Kline and Moretti
(2014a), place-based policies may also be used to reduce frictions such as excessive regulation. There
may be political constraints that prevent the central government from implementing a reform nationally,
such that a reduction within a subset of cities may be the best achievable alternative. In this case,
rms would again relocate towards the SEZ and increase total factor productivity further through a
larger labor pool. The reduction in frictions may also reduce prices, which could explain why prices are
not increasing as much in our data as we may expect based on a simple spatial equilibrium framework.
Another friction that can be relaxed by SEZ is the hukou system that restricts labor mobility, as SEZ
may make it easier for workers to move there.
Finally, although the establishment of SEZ appears to have generated positive spillovers outside of
the areas where they were introduced, we cannot rule out that the industrial policy drew resources
away from locations that are remote and far away from the SEZ. In spite of these caveats, our results
provide the basis for a realistic assessment of the e¤ects of industrial policy in China, and some useful
new evidence in the debate on place-based industrial policy in di¤erent countries.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Real GDP (mil) 20938.83 30120.88 210 451172.34 5289
Growth of real GDP (%) 13.02 17.71 -52.19 594.78 4736
Real GDP per capita 5228.68 5066.3 220.26 51513.13 5252
Growth of real GDP per capita (%) 10.8 12.12 -75.77 391.7 4969
Land area (sq km) 14059.24 17185.24 137 253356 5335
Growth of land area (%) 16.58 276.78 -59.63 9423.84 5055
Population (mil) 3.85 2.92 0.1 48.51 5306
Growth of population (%) 2.26 16.28 -77.31 347.56 5030
Electricity consumption (GWh) 3.08 4.72 0.01 56.3 5210
Growth of electricity consumption (%) 17.67 198.6 -98.97 13486.34 4914
Mean light intensity 11.74 10.31 0.1 56.04 4730
Growth of mean light intensity per satellite (%) 4.38 14.48 -45.64 117.23 4274
The table shows the descriptive statistics of our main variables in our sample of 276 cities in 25 provinces
from 1988 to 2010. Real GDP is derived from city-level nominal GDP and provincial deators. Land area
is the o¢ cial size of the cities. Population includes registered residents only. Electricity consumption
is by households and rms. Mean light intensity is the average brightness of pixels in the city.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (at beginning of sample period) by region and reform year
Region: Coast Inland
Reform year: All < 1988 1988-2010 Never < 1988 1988-2010 Never
Population (1,000 people) 3113.0 5282.5 3913.0 2968.8 - 3381.2 2319.7
Land area (km2) 10266.6 9811.4 8059.6 10247.1 - 10414.4 11384.2
Population density (people/km2) 402.3 561.1 553.9 353.9 - 375.3 344.9
Real GDP (millions) 4870.1 11363.7 7936.9 4215.4 - 5290.5 2515.9
Real GDP p.c. 1777.7 2072.9 2290.0 1722.7 - 1867.1 1441.0
Nominal GDP p.c. 1862.0 2180.9 2408.7 1816.4 - 1945.3 1502.9
Government spending/GDP (%) 8.7 7.5 7.0 8.4 - 9.3 9.6
# of universities (per mil. people) 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.4 - 3.3 1.4
The table shows the mean values of selected city characteristics at the beginning of our sample (averaged over
1988 and 1989), separately for reformers before 1988, reformers between 1988 and 2010, and cities that never had
a reform. The table also distinguishes inland and coastal cities. Note that no inland city was reformed before
1988. We restrict the sample to a balanced panel.
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Table 3: Baseline regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.156*** 0.116*** 0.0927*** 0.213*** 0.175*** 0.130**
(0.0330) (0.0292) (0.0283) (0.0693) (0.0560) (0.0532)
Province-level SEZ 0.0217 -0.00166 -0.0113 0.0209 -0.0106 -0.00580
(0.0226) (0.0182) (0.0165) (0.0310) (0.0252) (0.0232)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.960 0.975 0.974 0.949 0.972 0.971
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All speci-
cations include city xed e¤ects and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the city level.
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Table 4: Pre-reform trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indicator for 3 years before state-level SEZ -0.00836 -0.00322 -0.0129 0.128 -0.104 -0.0109
(0.0327) (0.0284) (0.0299) (0.0972) (0.0932) (0.0801)
Indicator for 2 years before state-level SEZ -0.0286 -0.0190 -0.0278 0.0765 -0.135 -0.0479
(0.0334) (0.0285) (0.0315) (0.0954) (0.0944) (0.0787)
Indicator for 1 year before state-level SEZ -0.0221 -0.0164 -0.0291 0.0508 -0.165* -0.0836
(0.0342) (0.0287) (0.0322) (0.0984) (0.0968) (0.0821)
Indicator for year of state-level SEZ -0.00807 -0.00737 -0.0154 0.0689 -0.167* -0.0787
(0.0346) (0.0290) (0.0342) (0.0950) (0.0954) (0.0830)
Indicator for years after state-level SEZ 0.143*** 0.107*** 0.0758* 0.280*** 0.0551 0.0834
(0.0445) (0.0377) (0.0417) (0.0985) (0.0989) (0.0920)
Indicator for years after province-level SEZ 0.0212 -0.00198 -0.0119 0.0227 -0.0134 -0.00684
(0.0228) (0.0183) (0.0167) (0.0314) (0.0256) (0.0234)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.960 0.975 0.974 0.949 0.972 0.971
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. Lags are dened
as described in the table. All specications include controls for land area, city xed e¤ects, and the interaction
of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 5: Di¤erential trends for reformers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.116*** 0.0588** 0.0511* 0.175*** 0.0259 0.0738
(0.0292) (0.0278) (0.0286) (0.0560) (0.0627) (0.0607)
Province-level SEZ -0.00166 -0.00112 -0.00200 -0.000637 -0.0106 -0.00913 -0.0135 -0.0143
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0257)
Time trend of reformers (state-level) 0.00711*** 0.00410 0.00433 0.0130** -0.0122 -0.0116
(0.00260) (0.00330) (0.00328) (0.00590) (0.0131) (0.0122)
Post-reform trend (state-level) 0.00470 0.0168** 0.0264* 0.0455**
(0.00403) (0.00658) (0.0145) (0.0202)
Sq. post-reform trend (state-level) -0.000558* -0.000986
(0.000289) (0.000813)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5321 5321 5321 5321 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy
switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. The trend variables are described in
Equation (2). All specications include controls for land area, city xed e¤ects, and the interaction of province-
year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 6: Controlling for di¤erential trends
Panel A : Year xed e¤ects interacted with initial characteristics (relative to median)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.0936*** 0.257*** 0.238*** 0.257***
(0.0389) (0.0370) (0.0341) (0.0685) (0.0908) (0.0680)
Province-level SEZ 0.0273 0.0116 -0.0154 0.0148 0.00248 -0.0180
(0.0215) (0.0181) (0.0162) (0.0345) (0.0281) (0.0269)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4727 4663 4618 2375 2315 2292
Adj. Rsq. 0.968 0.977 0.978 0.959 0.975 0.974
Panel B: Year xed e¤ects interacted with initial characteristics (dummies for above median)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.140*** 0.102*** 0.0772** 0.241*** 0.182** 0.187***
(0.0363) (0.0333) (0.0314) (0.0886) (0.0737) (0.0667)
Province-level SEZ 0.0246 -0.00204 -0.0148 0.0197 -0.00532 -0.00683
(0.0217) (0.0180) (0.0164) (0.0321) (0.0270) (0.0237)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.963 0.976 0.976 0.953 0.973 0.971
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. The specications
in Panel A control for year dummies interacted with the logarithm of population, GDP per capita, population
density, and number of universities relative to the median in the year in which a city enters the sample. The
specications in Panel B control for year dummies interacted with indicators for population, GDP per capita,
population density, and number of universities being above the median in the year in which a city enters the
sample. The specications also include city xed e¤ects and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 7: Decomposition of the reform e¤ect
Panel A : GDP per capita, capital-labor ratio, population, and human capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.0927*** 0.131*** 0.0453 0.00295 0.130** 0.339*** 0.0599 0.00278
(0.0283) (0.0404) (0.0274) (0.00367) (0.0532) (0.0614) (0.0374) (0.00816)
Province-level SEZ -0.0113 -0.00402 0.0187 0.00214 -0.00580 -0.0385 -0.00177 0.00390
(0.0165) (0.0297) (0.0130) (0.00159) (0.0232) (0.0525) (0.0123) (0.00271)
Dependent Variable (log) Y/L K/L L h Y/L K/L L h
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5269 4495 5275 4561 2768 2219 2769 2261
Adj. Rsq. 0.974 0.965 0.822 0.961 0.971 0.960 0.883 0.950
Panel B: GDP per capita, population and human capital (census years only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.141*** 0.0965*** 0.182*** 0.175** 0.111*** 0.360***
(0.0374) (0.0359) (0.0485) (0.0720) (0.0368) (0.0807)
Province-level SEZ -0.0259 0.0527** 0.0747** -0.0238 -0.00423 0.102**
(0.0308) (0.0246) (0.0318) (0.0408) (0.0193) (0.0476)
Dependent Variable log(Y/L) log(L) avg. sch. log(Y/L) log(L) avg. sch.
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 694 695 582 366 366 303
Adj. Rsq. 0.984 0.784 0.979 0.984 0.892 0.979
Panel C: Total factor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.0617** 0.0553** 0.137*** 0.0631 0.0471 0.189***
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0346) (0.0455) (0.0446) (0.0527)
Province-level SEZ -0.00370 -0.00395 -0.0144 0.0203 0.0210 0.0336
(0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0212) (0.0259) (0.0268) (0.0291)
Prod. func. est. No restriction CRS Pre/Post No restriction CRS Pre/Post
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4019 4019 4019 1895 1895 1895
Adj. Rsq. 0.958 0.949 0.992 0.952 0.942 0.992
State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ
at that level. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP per capita, capital labor ratio, population,
or human capital based on the yearbook data. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP per
capita, population, and average schooling years based on the census data. In Panel C, the dependent variable is
the logarithm of TFP. In columns (1) and (2), TFP is estimated using the whole sample without restrictions on
the return to scale. In columns (3) and (4), they are estimated in the whole sample while imposing the constant
return to scale restriction. In columns (5) and (6), they are estimated in the pre- and post-1995 sample separately,
without imposing the restriction on the return to scale. All specications include city xed e¤ects, the interaction
of province-year dummies, and controls for land area. All regressions except columns (3) and (7) in Panel A and
columns (2) and (5) in Panel B also include controls for population. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 8: Spillovers across cities
Panel A : Distance to closest SEZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.213*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.193***
(0.0305) (0.0299) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0493) (0.0526) (0.0501) (0.0507)
Province-level SEZ -0.00390 -0.00217 -0.00174 -0.00151 -0.0120 -0.0152 -0.0145 -0.0134
(0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0250)
Log km distance next zone -0.0528** -0.111***
(0.0249) (0.0342)
Log driving time next zone -0.0816*** -0.124***
(0.0269) (0.0390)
Log transport costs next zone (10 cat) -0.0694*** -0.110***
(0.0210) (0.0307)
Log transport costs next zone (7 cat) -0.0655*** -0.105***
(0.0210) (0.0309)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5254 5321 5321 5321 2775 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.977 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Panel B: E¤ect of other SEZ within a 150 distance radius
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.177***
(0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0294) (0.0538) (0.0527) (0.0538) (0.0545)
Province-level SEZ -0.000753 -0.00228 -0.00261 -0.00139 -0.00957 -0.0138 -0.0152 -0.0107
(0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0252)
Indicator for other zone in 150 radius (distance) 0.0514* 0.0688
(0.0306) (0.0452)
Indicator for other zone in 150 radius (driving time) 0.102*** 0.102**
(0.0325) (0.0438)
Indicator for other zone in 150 radius (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.0685* 0.128***
(0.0354) (0.0475)
Indicator for other zone in 150 radius (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.0286 0.0560
(0.0330) (0.0414)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5321 5321 5321 5321 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy
switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. In Panel A, the additional independent
variable is distance to the next zone and is an inverse measure of spillover intensity, and a negative coe¢ cient
therefore implies a positive spillover e¤ect. In Panel B, the additional independent variable is indicator for other
zone in radius and is expected to have a positive coe¢ cient in the case of positive spillovers. All specications
include controls for land area, city xed e¤ects, and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors
are clustered at the city level.
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Table 9: GDP proxied by light and electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-level SEZ 0.0501** 0.0460 0.157*** 0.0389
(0.0254) (0.0537) (0.0555) (0.0722)
Province-level SEZ -0.00754 -0.0322 0.0344 0.0339
(0.0183) (0.0281) (0.0358) (0.0425)
Dependent variable (log) Light Light Electricity Electricity
Controlling for log land area No No Yes Yes
Sample Full Inland Full Inland
N 4730 2570 5207 2718
Adj. Rsq. 0.836 0.817 0.792 0.755
The dependent variable is the logarithm of light intensity at the city level or the logarithm
of electricity consumption in the urban core of the city. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at
that level. All specications include city xed e¤ects and the interaction of province-year
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 10: Controlling for road infrastructure and government spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.146*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.203*** 0.186*** 0.159***
(0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0284) (0.0542) (0.0533) (0.0428)
Province-level SEZ -0.00786 0.00163 -0.00130 -0.0138 0.00201 -0.0140
(0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0236) (0.0261) (0.0241)
Log road area 0.0761*** 0.0433*** 0.0329** 0.0628** 0.0270 0.0128
(0.0215) (0.0161) (0.0150) (0.0302) (0.0220) (0.0158)
Log government spending 0.480*** 0.505*** 0.432*** 0.466***
(0.0573) (0.0602) (0.0628) (0.0483)
Log government spending/income -0.281*** -0.319***
(0.0458) (0.0458)
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4423 2633 2632 2336 1427 1427
Adj. Rsq. 0.978 0.988 0.990 0.975 0.986 0.989
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy
switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All specications include city xed
e¤ects, the interaction of province-year dummies, and controls for land area. Standard errors are clustered at
the city level.
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Figure 1: Location of treated cities in 2010: The cities in our sample with at least one state-level SEZ
in 2010 are marked in black (a city may have more than one zone). The cities in our sample without a
SEZ in 2010 are marked in grey.
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Figure 2: Share of cities with di¤erent types of zones: The gure shows the share of cities which have
a state-level SEZ. The gure also shows the di¤erent types of SEZ: Hightech Industrial Development
Zones, Economic and Technological Development Zones, Export Processing Zones, Bonded Zones, Bor-
der Economic Cooperation Zones, and other types. The sample is restricted to 172 cities that are
observed in all years between 1988 and 2010.
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Figure 3: Reform e¤ects over time in the full sample and inland sample: The bars show the coe¢ cients
of a regression of the logarithm of nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the rst zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the condence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the
reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform
indicators drops to 9. The regressions also control for an indicator for province-level zones, land area,
city xed e¤ects, and province-time xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by city.
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Figure 4: Reform e¤ects on GDP per capita, physical capital per capita, human capital, and TFP over
time: The bars show the coe¢ cients of a regression of the four dependent variables on indicators for
years before and after the rst SEZ was established. TFP is computed using a full-sample unrestricted
production function estimation. The solid and dashed lines show the condence interval. The vertical
dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number of
observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regressions control for an indicator for
province-level zones, population, land area, city xed e¤ects, and province-time xed e¤ects. Standard
errors are clustered by city.
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Figure 5: The upper two graphs show the estimates from a regression of the logarithm of nominal GDP
on indicators for years before and after the rst zone in the own city and zones within 150 minutes
driving time. The e¤ect of the time lag since the own reform year (left graph) is included together
with the time lags from the rst zone within 150 minutes driving time (right graph). The lower two
graphs show the same when a radius of 150 kilometers is used. The solid and dashed lines show the
condence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and
subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regressions
also control for an indicator for province-level zones, land area, city xed e¤ects, and province-time
xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by city.
49
